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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines what effect disasters have on social capital. Given the ambiguity in 
the literature on the relationship between social capital and disasters, it is important to study this 
intersection further. This relationship is analyzed through a quantitative inquiry of Hurricane 
Irene (2011), Hurricane Sandy (2012), and Hurricane Matthew (2016) in the US as well as a 
qualitative case study from news sources in Hoboken, NJ following Hurricane Sandy. I break 
down social capital into attitudinal and behavioral components. My findings suggest that social 
capital generally increases following hurricanes. What is notable about these findings is that not 
all components of social capital reacted uniformly, with formal membership in civil society 
groups declining overall. There was evidence in the case study to suggest that this trend was 
offset by informal group behavior and effective government, business, and philanthropic aid. My 
findings demonstrate that both informal groups and governmental aid can promote post-disaster 
social capital.   
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 The central question asked in this thesis pertains to the effect of experiencing a disaster 
on social capital, which is integral to civic life and democratic norms. Do disasters encourage a 
commitment to pro-democratic norms, such as civic participation and engagement with 
community? Or might it have the opposite effect or none at all? While this relationship has been 
studied before, the literature remains inconclusive as to its nature, with some studies showing 
that disasters increase social capital while others show that they decrease it (Toya & Skidmore, 
2014; Albrecht, 2018).  
This project analyzes World Values Survey (WVS) data to investigate the effects of three 
hurricanes on social capital among respondents in the areas affected by these hurricanes. The 
results are compared to unaffected states in the US. These findings will be considered in the 
context of the larger literature on disasters and their associated political effects. This approach is 
complemented by a qualitative analysis of local news sources from Hoboken, New Jersey 
following Hurricane Sandy.  
Hurricanes are a climate-related event known to be of concern to Americans that are 
projected to increase in intensity as climate change progresses (Leiserowitz et al., 2018; NASA 
2008). This makes it a pertinent area to study, given the large effects of such storm. As the 
storms become more intense, any associated political effects will become more evident.  
It is not hard to imagine how such an increasingly disruptive future environment might 
exacerbate trends of inequality and individualism, reducing community engagement and 
cohesion. Disasters may increase inequality, as FEMA restores lost property wealth, resulting in 
more money paid to those who had more in the first place (Howell & Elliot, 2019). Additionally, 
it may increase individualism, as following disasters there are often reports of anti-social 
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behavior, such as theft (Rodríguez et al., 2006, p.83). On the other hand, a well-organized 
grassroots effort to prepare local communities for the worst of climate-change related effects 
could conceivably reinvigorate political and civic engagement, like that envisioned in Dryzek’s 
(1996; 2013) ecological democracy discourse analysis.  
Taking this into account, a central aim of this thesis is to determine the effect of disasters 
on social capital by studying the states affected by three major hurricanes in the US between 
2011 and 2017 in addition to undertaking a case study examining one community in depth 
through newspaper accounts. Investigating this through quantitative and qualitative methods will 
add to the growing body of work on the effects of disasters.   
 
PREVIOUS WORK  
While it is known that disasters can influence politics, there remains a lot to study as to 
their effects on a variety of political processes. Some well-studied areas include voter 
retrospection, voter turnout, and social capital (Arceneaux & Stein, 2006; Chen, 2013; Ramos & 
Sanz 2020; Bechtel & Hainmueller, 2011; Toya & Skidmore, 2014; Sinclair et al., 2011; Jenkins, 
2019). Nonetheless, there is little consensus as to the effects of disasters on those areas 
(Albrecht, 2018; Rubin, 2020).  
In the past, hurricanes have been found to impact elections and public opinion of elected 
officials (Moynihan, 2012; Chen, 2013; Derickson, 2014; Lay, 2009). While some point to the 
shark attacks during President Wilson’s administration to show that disasters are typically 
blamed on incumbents regardless of their control over the issue (Achen & Bartels, 2016), more 
recent research about Canada and Spain has demonstrated that in some cases effective 
management of a disaster can increase support of an incumbent (Bodet et al., 2016; Ramos & 
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Sanz, 2020), indicating a diversity of potential electoral responses to disasters. On policy issues, 
hurricanes have been found to increase the political popularity of taxation and social programs in 
the US, seen as a form of altruism following a disaster whereas they are generally cast in a 
negative light (Frankovic, 2008).  
This raises questions about what impacts climate-driven disasters may have on political 
and civic participation, particularly given the concern many Americans have around the climate. 
While younger generations typically participate in politics at lower rates than older groups, 
environmental issues are an exception to that trend, with the young leading the charge on 
environmental activism (Twenge et al., 2012; Census, 2016; Ballew et al., 2019). Approximately 
half of Americans say they have experienced effects from climate change and 61% are worried 
about heat waves and flooding, yet less than half say there is any social norm to act (Leiserowitz 
et al., 2018). Others have found that while disseminating information of flood risk can raise 
individuals’ desire to become politically active, there is no assurance that their desire will 
necessarily translate into concrete action (Lieske et al., 2014). Research suggests that there is an 
opportunity for- but no assurance of- an environmental rejuvenation of political involvement. 
This points to the salience of studying the political effects of disasters, not only because 
disasters will become stronger as climate change progresses, but also because of the deep impact 
they have on individuals’ lives. The impact of these events may incentivize them to alter how 
they act and how they think about the world. Social capital in particular is not only important for 
individuals and their relationship to others but is also integral to supporting key democratic 
norms (Putnam, 1993; Putnam, 2001).  
The literature on the relationship between social capital and disasters indicates that 
disasters provide opportunities to grow existing stocks of social capital as well as opportunities 
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for the disaster to disrupt and diminish existing social capital. There is a large degree of 
ambiguity as to whether social capital will grow or deplete as a result of a disaster (Toya & 
Skidmore, 2014; Albrecht, 2018). Not only is the degree to which there are opportunities for the 
growth or diminishment of social capital important, but there are a multitude of contextual 
factors that can mediate this relationship. Some of these factors can include the role of the 
government and the media, local community characteristics, and sup-population group dynamics. 




Democratic norms are essential to the functioning of a democracy, with social capital 
being one important normative component of that (Putnam, 1993). While most people think of 
democracy as being defined by the ability of citizens to vote for their leaders, a true democracy 
requires more than that to function properly. A fully-fledged democracy must be a liberal 
democracy, balancing the rights of individuals with the right of the majority to self-govern1 
(Mounk, 2018). There is danger both in excessive division among groups and excessive, 
unchecked power vested in the government (Madison et al., 1987). The way governments are 
constructed has significant sway over how those factors play out (Ginsburg & Huq, 2018). 
Beyond the institutional set up of a democracy, it also matters what people do. It matters how 
those in elected office act (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). It also matters how the people themselves 
act (Putnam, 1993; Tocqueville, 1841). This is to say democratic norms matter.  
 
1 This reference to liberal democracy is a reference to the concept of protecting minority rights and the right of the 
majority to self-government in opposition to so-called “illiberal democracies” who proport to be democratic but seek 
to exclude sub-populations from full citizenship and rights, damaging democratic integrity (Muller, 2016, p. 50).  
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Social capital has long been associated with successful democracies. As Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1841) pointed out over century and a half ago, what made democracy work in 
America was that the people participated in civic life, an integral aspect of social capital. This 
point was substantiated in the work of Robert Putnam (1993), pointing out that there were “more 
successful regional governments [in 20th century Italy] merely because they happen[ed] to be 
more civic” rather than richer or more developed (p.98-99). Those in less civic regions had less 
generalized trust and subscribed more to ‘law and order’ ideals to solve the collective action 
dilemma to get a group to cooperate (Putnam, 1993, p.111-112).  
Given that research on the political effects of disasters is varied and the democratic norms 
supported by social capital are critical for the health of a democracy, this is an important 
intersection to study. We know that hurricanes have produced political effects (Achen & Bartels, 
2016; Akarca & Tansel, 2016; Arceneaux & Stein, 2006; Bechtel & Hainmueller, 2011; Chen, 
2018; Goebel et al., 2015; Hart, 2014; Jenkins, 2019, Xu et al., 2020). However, there is little 
consensus across the scholarship as to what those effects are (Bodet et al., 2016; Lay, 2009; 
Montjoy & Chervenak, 2020; Ramos & Sanz, 2020; Rubin, 2020; Rudolph & Kuhn, 2018; 
Sinclair et al., 2011). Specifically, in terms of social capital, this is also little consensus on the 
effects of disasters, such as hurricanes (Toya & Skidmore, 2014; Albrecht, 2018). Therefore, it is 
important to research this area as these storms become more intense.  
 This research is also important because as climate change increases the average global 
temperature, severe weather events, like hurricanes, are projected to worsen. It is clear that both 
the Earth’s oceans and its atmosphere are warming (Buis, 2020). Warm water temperatures are 
ideal for creating hurricanes, as they need a minimum of 79 degrees Fahrenheit at the sea’s 
surface to form (Buis, 2020). Additionally, warmer air temperatures raise the dew point, 
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allowing more water to accumulate before condensing and turning into precipitation. Research 
from NASA shows that climate driven temperature increases in tropical oceans may warm the 
surface by as much as 4.8 degrees Fahrenheit by 2100 (Smith, 2019). Such a scenario would 
result in a 60% increase in the incidence of extreme storms (Smith, 2019). Based on these 
expected changes, all communities in the American east and south will face increased risk from 
hurricanes, but this change will be most pronounced in the northeast (Pant & Cha, 2019). For this 
reason, it is important to understand the relationship between hurricanes and social capital.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 The core research strategy of this thesis involves comparison of trends in social capital 
development in areas affected by hurricanes with trends in areas unaffected by hurricanes. In that 
sense, this analysis uses a quasi-experimental design to detect any discernable impacts of 
hurricanes on behaviors and attitudes associated with social capital. The states affected by the 
storms in question serve as the treatment group and the unaffected states will be the control. The 
independent variable is the occurrence of the disaster, and the dependent variables are three 
dimensions of social capital. The data used to analyze this will come from the World Values 
Survey data, utilizing the surveys that occurred in the US in 2011 and 2017.2  The timetable of 
the WVS’ data allows me to investigate the effects of Hurricanes Irene, Sandy, and Matthew, 
which occurred between the survey rounds.  
 My analysis seeks to determine how various components of social capital evolved after 
experiencing these hurricanes and if this differed from the unaffected regions of the US. Looking 
 
2 For clarity, the WVS published its Wave 6 data in 2014 and its Wave 7 data in 2020, but the surveys were 
conducted prior to those dates in the US. Wave 6 interviews were conducted in June and July 2011, and Wave 7 
interviews were conducted in April and May 2017.  
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at the differences- if any- that occurred provides insight into how experiencing a disaster affects 
an area. All of the disasters in question occurred after the first survey was completed in the US in 
2011 and before the second survey began in 2017. This allows me to use the data provided by the 
WVS to evaluate the effect of these disasters on social capital in the affected area.  
 These changes are also tested for statistical significance with a difference of proportions 
test. By verifying that the results found are statistically significant, I am able to assess the 
probability of the observed results being the result of chance or truly resulting from the 
occurrence of the storms themselves.  
 My research includes a literature review to summarize documented trends in the disaster 
literature, with an emphasis on politically oriented research. The trends identified here are 
considered in the discussion and analysis of these hurricanes to highlight how usual or unusual 
my findings are. The literature informs my analysis of the WVS data and provides some potential 
explanations for the results observed there.  
 Following the data analysis, I investigate news sources in Hoboken, New Jersey as a case 
study to put my findings in context. I use this information to inform my discussion of the data 
analysis and attempt to figure out whether any of the potential explanations explored in that 
section actually played out in a specific case. This section is important since social capital and 
disasters are localized phenomena that are inseparable from their specific contexts.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW: SOCIAL CAPITAL & DISASTERS 
 
Democracy depends on what people do, as discussed earlier. One large component 
guiding how people act are norms, which are not necessarily codified and written into law. 
Social capital is one such important component of normative support for democracy. This makes 
it a pertinent political phenomenon to study, being tied to strong democratic societies and 
thriving economies (Putnam, 1993).  
In the aftermath of disasters, many focus on the loss of life and economic damages that 
come from these extreme events. Another important aspect is the effect disasters have on long-
term social and political processes within the affected communities. The literature on social 
capital and disasters does not indicate any one set way that disasters affect social capital. In some 
cases, it increases, and in others it decreases. Some studies indicate that disasters can activate 
existing networks, demonstrating how social capital appreciates through use. Others indicate that 
new networks form. And other studies indicate that networks are disrupted, resulting in 
diminishing social capital. There is no clear consensus on how long these changes last.  
This ambiguity might be explained by the multiple effects of disasters on social capital, 
both disrupting existing social capital networks and providing opportunities for new networks to 
emerge. Moreover, whether social capital increases or decreases may depend on the context of 
the individual case. This ambiguity documented in the literature on disasters demonstrates the 
need for more research in this area, highlighting the significance of my research.  
 
DEFINING SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 While there are multiple conceptions of social capital, it is by and large seen as a 
complementary form of capital to more traditional kinds of capital, such as human and physical. 
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Bourdieu (1986) defines it as an “actual or potential” resource that individuals can access within 
networks of “mutual acquaintance and recognition” (p.251). This definition lends itself to 
defining social capital as a private resource for individuals to use (Wang & Ganapati, 2018). In 
contrast, Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993) view social capital as a public good in the form of 
a collective resource (Wang & Ganapati, 2018). Coleman defines it as a social structure that can 
facilitate the actions of various actors. Putnam defines it as consisting of voluntary cooperation 
perpetuated by norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement that appreciates with use 
(1993). Stolle and Hooghe (2004) combine these private and collective views of social capital in 
their structural and attitudinal framework, defining the structural components as civic networks- 
both formal and informal- and the attitudinal components as norms and values.  
Social capital can further be broken down into three types: bonding, bridging, and 
linking. Bonding is an inward-looking bond based on a relationship of trust and cooperation 
within a homogeneous group, such as a family or an ethnic group (Sadeka et al., 2020; Torres et 
al. 2019). Bridging is defined as an outward looking connection between groups of people who 
are dissimilar in some way, such as between different ethnic groups (Sadeka et al., 2020; Torres 
et al., 2019). Linking social capital is the connection between individuals or groups to 
institutions or those in positions of authority (Sadeka et al., 2020; Torres et al., 2019). 
The above dimensions of social capital aid in my understanding of different aspects of 
this phenomenon and will inform my research. As I explore the impact of hurricanes, I will work 
with a somewhat different framework. One issue that immediately presents itself when reviewing 
the literature on social capital is that both conceptualizations and operationalizations of social 
capital vary, with scholars emphasizing one or more different dimensions. Bourdieu, for 
instance, emphasizes individual recognition of others as potential or actual connections and 
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resources. Coleman emphasizes the functional aspect of social capital, focusing on the social 
structures that facilitate interactions. Finally, Putnam emphasizes civic participation in groups, 
like Coleman, but adds the importance of generalized trust to make these connection work. 
Whereas Bourdieu views social capital as being primarily private, Coleman and Putnam both 
view social capital as intrinsically connected to the public good. 
These varying conceptualizations suggest that the macro-concept of social capital is 
multi-dimensional. In my study, I seek to capture those different dimensions, exploring both 
attitudinal and behavioral dimensions of this phenomenon. Attitudinal social capital pertains to 
beliefs and views about the individual’s community. Behavioral social capital pertains to how 
people interact with that community. I attempt to capture these by operationalizing social capital 
in three different ways. The first two operationalize the attitudinal aspects of social capital, and 
the third references the behavioral dimension. First, I examine feelings of connection to the 
community. Second, I measure levels of trust. And third, I explore rates of membership in key 
organizations. Breaking down the dimensions of social capital in this way should provide some 
clarity into how hurricanes affect social capital. It is possible that some aspects will be affected 
differently from others. Examining social capital in this way should provide insight as to why the 
literature on the relationship between social capital and disasters remains ambiguous. 
 
THE ROOTS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 Social capital’s root causes are varied, but they primarily rely on repeated interactions 
managing common pool resources beginning with close relations and eventually expanding 
outwards to broader swaths of society. Putnam (1993) argues that social capital theory provides a 
better response to the collective action problem in contrast to other explanations, such as game 
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theory, which he argues underpredicts voluntary cooperation. He also criticizes the Hobbesian 
leviathan and institutional answers as failing to explain how a society develops a trusted, neutral 
arbiter. He argues that such required trust is developed through repeated interactions dealing with 
common pool resources that allow norms and patterns of reciprocity to emerge, creating a belief 
that such rules will continue to be followed (Putnam, 1993). It is the voluntary nature of 
cooperation that creates the personal trust that is in turn leveraged into social trust (Putnam, 
1993). These arrangements emerge easily in thick networks, such as those found amongst kin. In 
larger social contexts, once these norms are established and grown through continued use, it 
becomes easier to overcome shirking and exploitation risks (Putnam, 1993). The connections 
built from engaging in those norms with others create the connecting networks, such as bonding, 
bridging, and linking networks, that create social capital within a community.  
The roots of social capital are not necessarily clear cut and linear but instead emerge from 
a path-dependent history that leads communities into either vicious or virtuous cycles that raise 
or degrade the of functioning institutions and social capital. Societies with strong social capital 
networks create a virtuous cycle that continually increases the stock of social capital through its 
continued use, reducing transaction costs and increasing cooperation (Putnam, 1993). This in 
turn creates stronger states and stronger economies (Putnam, 1993). In Italy, Putnam finds that 
the northern region during the 20th century proved to be more civic, having accumulated strong 
norms of trust and mutual reciprocity since 1100. In contrast, the southern region- long 
characterized by widespread distrust, crime, isolation, and vertical hierarchy- proved to be less 
civic during the 20th century, caught in a vicious cycle. Based on his analysis, Putnam (1993) 
argues that states and markets operate more effectively within a civic community and that the 
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seeds of such efficiency are path dependent, found in the past based on the slow-changing nature 
of norms and institutions that mutually influence one another. 
 
SOCIAL & POLITICAL EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL  
Studies into participation in civic society confirm the path dependent nature of social 
capital, highlighting one effect of social capital on social and political processes. Research into 
the spontaneous volunteers in New York City on 9/11 finds that, even years later, those who 
volunteered expressed increased sentiments of connection with the community and increased 
involvement in community service organizations after the initial recovery from the disaster that 
sparked their engagement (Lowe & Fothergill, 2003; Steffen & Fothergill, 2009). This shows 
how prior use of behavioral social capital results in its continued use and appreciation over time, 
creating more community involvement.  
 In addition to civic participation, social capital is also associated with political 
participation. Theorists like Putnam view social capital as central to the strength of a civic 
society, underscoring how it might be intertwined with the level of participation in elections. 
Given the low probability of casting the decisive vote in an election and the personal cost 
associated with voting (Rudolph & Kuhn, 2017, p.3), motivation to overcome this disincentive 
might come from networks connecting individuals to voter registration and polling locations, for 
example. In a study of voter turnout in regions negatively affected by the 2011 Great East Japan 
Earthquake, those with larger social networks were more likely to turn out to vote after the 
disaster, suggesting a relationship between social capital and voter turnout rates (Jenkins, 2019). 
Other researchers have used voter turnout to measure social capital empirically (Wang & 
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Ganapati, 2018). These connections found in the literature underscore the importance of studying 
social capital. 
Beyond civic and political participation, strong stocks of social capital can also promote 
better functioning states, economies, and democracies (Putnam, 1993). Because social capital 
emerges out of a cyclical process, it is not only affected by existing institutions but also 
transforms them. Social capital in turn promotes the creation of more social capital via continued 
trust in those institutions and others within the community. It is this trust that facilitates well-
functioning economics and states (Putnam, 1993). Beyond its interactions with these institutions, 
social capital’s promotion of community engagement also strengthens democracy. Civic 
engagement has long been thought to be central to functioning democracies (Tocqueville, 1841).  
While social capital is largely seen as a social good, it can also contribute to social and 
economic inequality due to the way it builds in path-dependent virtuous or vicious cycles. Social 
capital is known to be unevenly distributed throughout a society and has been shown to be 
associated with certain social and economic groups. In the US, areas that are wealthier, more 
racially or ethnically homogenous, and older with higher employment rates and residential 
stability have been shown to possess more social capital (Zahnow et al., 2019; Wang & 
Ganapati, 2018). These trends suggest that socioeconomic status and being a part of certain 
social or identity groups can to some degree predict the level of social capital that individuals or 
groups can access. This is important to keep in mind, as my analysis of social capital following 
disasters does not examine subsets of the affected population. So, while I will not be able to draw 
conclusions about inequality in regards to social capital, that does not mean it is not playing a 
role in post-disaster levels of social capital.  
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HOW SOCIAL CAPITAL AFFECTS DISASTER RESPONSE 
 Social capital has been shown to have a positive, protective effect on communities in 
terms of preparation for and recovery after a disaster. Preparedness for a disaster includes an 
individual’s access to early warnings, knowledge, resources, training, and networks related to a 
disaster (Sadeka et al., 2020). These traits clearly overlap with traits of social capital. Thus, 
groups that are less connected to such preemptive resources are more at risk of adverse outcomes 
following a disaster. This was seen in a study of an indigenous ethnic minority in Malaysia, the 
Orang Asli, whose comparative lack of linking and bridging social capital leaves them less 
prepared than other groups for disasters (Sadeka et al., 2020).  
Generally, it is believed that preexisting social capital before a disaster is also beneficial 
to the recovery after the fact by facilitating more efficient emergency responses (Wang & 
Ganapati, 2018, p.298). Following Haiti’s 2010 earthquake, those with strong social capital 
connections were better able to access shelters and other recovery-related resources (Rahill et al., 
2014). Following Hurricane Katrina, small businesses that were affected in the area were better 
off if they had more access to social capital- particularly linking and bridging- before the disaster 
(Torres et al., 2019). Similarly, social capital-related networks of connections developed by local 
governments helped more efficiently implement disaster governance following the 2010-2011 
Queensland floods in Australia (Melo Zurita et al., 2018). This research indicates a strong level 
of continuity in social capital before and after a disaster, with preexisting levels predicting 
preparedness and recovery, although other factors play a role as well (Wickes et al., 2017). 
Some researchers are more tentative about how strong the impact of social capital is on 
post-disaster functioning. Wickes et al. (2015) concluded that social capital has a limited effect 
on the post-disaster environment, positing that structural conditions such as the strength of the 
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governmental and economic response to the disaster have more long-lasting effects on 
community resilience than pre-existing social capital. Zahnow et al. (2019) in studying the same 
Australian flooding event found that individual-level rather than community-level social capital 
had protective effects for social functioning and connection. This demonstrates that not all types 
of social capital provide equal benefits to a community after a disaster and that political and 
economic factors can influence post-disaster outcomes as well.  
 
HOW DISASTERS AFFECT SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Moving beyond looking at how social capital affects disaster response, the literature 
makes it clear that disasters themselves can influence social capital, which is critical for my 
research. One such effect is to diminish social capital immediately following a disaster, largely 
due to the disruptions to the pre-existing networks caused by the event. The community’s need to 
band together to respond to a disaster can also lead to an increase in social capital. The drivers of 
these disparate outcomes are discussed below.  
The first way that disasters can diminish social capital is by disrupting interpersonal 
networks through displacement caused by the storm. In a study of the 182 counties affected by 
Hurricane Katrina, social capital decreased directly following the disaster but over time 
experienced a gradual recovery (Wang & Ganapati, 2018). The recovery rate was slower than the 
pre-Katrina growth rate of social capital (Wang & Ganapati, 2018). The initial decrease was 
attributed to the loss of the community structure caused by the unprecedented storm that resulted 
in a massive evacuation (Wang & Ganapati, 2018). That loss in networks is what is used by 
Zahnow et al. (2019) to explain the lack of protective effect of neighborhood and community 
social capital after a flooding event in Australia.  
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Another way that disasters can decrease social capital is through long term disruptions of 
interpersonal networks caused by a post-disaster rent gap. This decrease in social capital 
following disasters can be explained by economic and social capital inequalities, 
disproportionately pushing low socioeconomic status (SES) groups out of the area. A 
longitudinal study of the Houston metropolitan area finds that over time large-scale disasters 
cause displacement of low SES communities via rent gaps that develop from investors using 
adversely affected property to rebuild and sell at a profit (Wyczalkowski et al., 2019). This trend, 
should it hold true elsewhere, may explain the decrease in social capital and the long-term 
slowing of growth of social capital seen by Wang & Ganapati (2018).  
The severity of a disaster can also contribute to diminishing social capital, with more 
intense storms that pass critical thresholds resulting in less social capital. Albrecht (2018) uses 
12 disasters in Europe to measure social trust, one form of social capital. Overall, this study finds 
that disasters with a death toll of nine or more are associated with decreasing social trust 
(Albrecht, 2018). The study also finds that eventually there is a return to pre-disaster levels of 
trust (Albrecht, 2018). This is similar to the trends seen by Wang & Ganapati (2018). Overall, 
social capital is found to decrease in the immediate aftermath of a disaster as a result of 
disruptions to existing social networks caused by the disaster, but this decrease may only be 
temporary.  
Social capital can also be diminished by emergent anti-social behavior during a disaster. 
During Hurricane Katrina in 2005, there were “rumors about invading gangs of young black 
men,” in response to which some wealthy white neighborhoods armed themselves (Rodríguez et 
al., 2006, p.92). Other rumors of crime at the Superdome and the Convention Center led to some 
residents’ resistance to evacuate in the face of the storm (Rodríguez et al., 2006). Rumors of anti-
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social behavior, in some cases utilizing racist stereotypes, spurred both anti-social behavior in 
arming a neighborhood against newcomers as well as delayed evacuations among other groups. 
The belief that there was widespread anti-social behavior led to a diminishment of bridging and 
linking social capital as groups became more insular, leaning into bonding social capital. It 
should be noted that the prevalence of anti-social behavior is often given outsized attention by 
the media following disasters (Rodríguez et al., 2006). Nonetheless, rumors of it as well as such 
actual behavior can diminish social capital.  
 While disasters can significantly disrupt preexisting social networks, they can also spur 
new identity groups around being affected by the disaster, which increase social capital. The 
sense of a common fate amongst those who experience a disaster can promote new group 
identities, as documented by Ntontis et al. (2018) following the 2015-2016 floods in York, UK. 
These new identities can lead to a sense of unity and mutual support, and they can even 
supersede preexisting group identities (Ntontis et al., 2018). This observation clearly 
demonstrates bonding and bridging social capital at work, as this emergent group identity 
facilitates access to resources and social support following the floods.  
Social capital can also increase after a disaster by spurring emergent groups that work to 
address the disaster. Emergent pro-social behavior was documented following Hurricane Katrina 
by Rodríguez et al. (2006) in groups ranging from hotel & hospital workers, local 
neighborhoods, and search and rescue teams to a federal disaster response team. These groups 
ranged from informal to formal in their structure. Some were newly emergent during the storm 
while others were repurposed to address the ongoing disaster. While not all of the behavior 
documented following Katrina was pro-social, a large majority of the emergent behavior was 
pro-social in nature (Rodríquez et al., 2006, p.84).  
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Another way that disasters increase social capital is by reactivating dormant group 
networks. Schuenemann (2020) found that Hurricane Sandy led to the reactivation of former 
Occupy Wall Street activists during the disaster to help coordinate the distribution of resources 
during the storm. Activists organized in response to perceived shortcomings of the government’s 
response to the hurricane (Schuenemann, 2020). This represents an increase in social capital by 
reviving formerly active community groups.  
The last way a disaster can increase social capital is related to the intensity and type of 
disaster. Toya & Skidmore (2014) found that between 1985-2004 predictable disasters that affect 
wide swaths of the population increased social trust the most via bridging capital. This is also 
impacted by the strength of the disaster, as for each increase of one standard deviation of storm 
activity, social trust increased by 6.5% (Toya & Skidmore, 2014, p.273). Disasters that affected 
one specific group that lived in a single geographical location, such as flooding events, did not 
have this effect (Toya & Skidmore, 2014). This trend was attributed to the fact that floods 
primarily affect low-lying areas, which are frequently inhabited by low SES residents because 
flood risk lowers property value.  
 
A CONTEXTUAL READING OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DISASTERS 
What may determine whether there is a net growth or decrease in social capital depends 
on the individual context of the disaster and the community it affects. It is that context that might 
determine whether the new networks formed following the disaster outweigh the loss to existing 
networks of social capital. Additionally, not all changes occur immediately, and the level of 
social capital immediately following the disaster may not reflect the totality of effects the 
disaster will cause in relation to social capital. As demonstrated by Wyczalkowski et al. (2019), 
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long term economic forces may cause a rent gap that over time disrupts social capital networks 
as a result of the initial disaster. Reactivated or newly formed groups might disband following 
recovery, having lost the initial common purpose that united them. The trends outlined above 
occur following numerous disasters. While many disasters have that in common, the ultimate 
long-term effect on social capital is only determined by the individual context of that case, which 
might explain the divergence of outcomes noted in the literature.  
As alluded to in the works of Toya & Skidmore (2014), Albrecht (2018), Rahill et al. 
(2014), and Sadeka (2020), the above effects are not necessarily consistent across all types of 
disasters, countries, and social groups. The major contextual factors that determine how social 
capital changes following a disaster are pre-existing levels of social capital, the role of the 
government, the locality’s characteristics, the role of the media, and sub-population variations 
(Albrecht, 2018; Rahill et al., 2014; Toya & Skidmore, 2014; Wickes et al., 2015; Pyles et al., 
2018; Rubin, 2020; Rodríguez et al., 2006; Hawkins & Maurer, 2010). Some examples that 
illustrate this include disasters in Haiti, Australia, and the US.  
Since social capital is not evenly distributed across a population, those with more 
connections may be able to better access resources during and after a disaster if there is not a 
sufficient effort to equalize these inequalities. This may lead to diverging trends in social capital, 
with those already better connected increasing their stock while the under-connected do not fare 
as well. Following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, those with higher pre-existing levels of social 
capital were better able to access resources in part due to government patrimonialism (Rahill et 
al., 2014).  
The government can step in and mediate the predictive relationship between pre-disaster 
social capital and access to resources during and after a disaster, smoothing out the inequalities 
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noted above. Demonstrating this, government intervention mediated the relationship between 
neighborhood-level social capital and post-disaster outcomes following a flooding event in 
Australia (Wickes et al., 2015).  
Beyond the role of the government, country size and regime type can have a contextual 
effect, with smaller and freer countries seeing larger growth of social capital after a disaster 
(Toya & Skidmore, 2014). One study of Haiti following the 2010 earthquake and the US after 
Hurricane Katrina provides an example of how social capital reacts differently depending on the 
country in question. Of the indicators to predict if individuals in each country participated in 
recovery efforts, less than half overlapped between the two countries (Pyles et al., 2018).  
As mentioned earlier, media portrayal of pro-social and anti-social behavior can influence 
others’ perception of a disaster (Wickes et al., 2017; Rodríguez et al., 2006). This can be 
accomplished by magnifying stories of pro-social or anti-social behavior, shaping individuals’ 
perceptions and actions. Additionally, social media can help facilitate community connections 
(Cheng & Mitomo, 2018; Wilensky, 2014). Both of these may have some explanatory power 
over the relationship between disasters and social capital (Albrecht, 2018).  
Lastly, social capital and disasters may not spur the same effects across all segments of a 
community. This was seen during Hurricane Katrina, where bonding social capital kept more 
black residents of New Orleans in the city rather than evacuating in order to stay with family 
members who refused to evacuate (Hawkins & Maurer, 2010). These examples highlight how 
many more factors than just social capital and disasters inform how social capital changes after 
disaster events.  
These contextual factors are important to note because they are likely to not only play a 
role in changes in social capital following Hurricane Irene, Hurricane Sandy, and Hurricane 
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Matthew, but also because they may provide some explanation for the patterns observed in my 
analysis below. While I will not be measuring these factors specifically, they remain important to 
bear in mind as I proceed with my analysis.  
  
CONCLUSION 
Holding other factors constant, pre-existing social capital is a protective factor for 
disasters in terms of preparedness and recovery, but disasters themselves can influence levels of 
social capital by promoting new networks and disrupting old ones. Whether social capital in the 
affected area sees a net increase or net decrease may be dependent on local, contextual variables. 
Critically for my study, however, the relationship between disasters and social capital is both 
important and inconclusive.  
Given that extreme weather events are projected to increase in intensity in the coming 
decades, it is even more important to understand that relationship. In the following section, I 
analyze the outcomes of social capital in the US following several notable hurricanes that 
occurred between 2011 and 2016. I analyze social capital development in the area affected by 
these hurricanes as compared to the rest of the US that was unaffected. I focus on three 
dimensions of social capital, which correspond to the interpretations of Bourdieu, Coleman, and 
Putnam. These three dimensions are connection, trust, and organizational membership. My 
findings suggest that social capital does not react uniformly to disasters across all three 
dimensions.   
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CHAPTER 3. EFFECTS OF DISASTERS ON SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 Based on the literature review, there is no clear consensus on how a disaster affects social 
capital. It is clear that pre-existing social capital mitigates the adverse effects of disasters 
(Sadeka et al., 2020; Torres et al., 2019; Melo Zurita et al., 2018). However, what reciprocal 
effect disasters have on social capital is less clear. There are case studies that indicate that they 
can diminish existing social capital networks (Albrecht, 2018; Zahnow et al., 2019). There are 
studies that indicate that disasters can reactive dormant networks (Rodríguez et al., 2006; 
Schuenemann, 2020). And there are studies that indicate that they can spark new networks 
(Rodríguez et al., 2006; Ntontis et al., 2018).  
While much of this research draws from case studies, even studies using quantitative 
datasets are often in conflict with one another. Toya & Skidmore (2014) find that for each 
standard deviation increase in storm intensity, social trust increases by 6.5%. In contrast, 
Albrecht (2018) finds that once death tolls from a disaster surpass nine, social trust decreases. 
Wang & Ganapati (2018) studied a major disaster in the US and found that the rate of growth of 
social capital was higher pre-disaster than post-disaster, with a dip immediately post-disaster and 
a subsequent recovery.  
 In order to study how social capital reacts following a disaster, I look at three dimensions 
of social capital to gauge how each component changed following the hurricanes. I examine 
feelings of closeness to the local community, levels of trust, and membership rate in community 
organizations. These three dimensions capture attitudinal and behavioral aspects of social capital, 
illuminating changes in how individuals feel about the community and how they interact with the 
community after a disaster. I hope for this to provide some clarity in investigating the 
relationship between social capital and disasters.  
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 Analysis of these three aspects of social capital shows that they did not react uniformly to 
the hurricanes. Between 2011 and 2017, attitudinal components of social capital generally 
increased or remained higher in the area affected by the hurricanes relative to the areas 
unaffected by the storms. In contrast, the behavioral component tended to decline in the affected 
region relative to the unaffected region. This seeming contradiction has several possible 
explanations, including the role of the government and emergent informal group behavior.  
 
HYPOTHESES 
The diversity of the findings from previous research make it difficult to predict any one 
direction for the effects of Hurricane Irene, Hurricane Sandy, and Hurricane Matthew on social 
capital. However, since the studies by Wang & Ganapati (2018), Rodríguez et al. (2006), and 
Schuenemann (2020) all studied the US, I expect to find similar patterns in my analysis despite 
the overall ambiguity of the literature.  
Based on the literature discussing emerging local groups and identities following 
disasters, such as in the works of Rodríguez et al. (2006) and Ntontis et al. (2018), I expect to see 
increases in feelings of connection with the local community, since disasters require local 
communities to coordinate and respond to disasters. While the US government plays a role in 
funding the response and recovery, disasters primarily affect specific and limited geographic 
locations. I expected this will push local communities to feel a need to band together, creating a 
stronger sense of connection. 
Based on the evidence of newly emergent and reactivated social networks documented by 
Rodríguez et al. (2006), Schuenemann (2020), and Wang & Ganapati (2018), I expect to see an 
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increase in the behavioral component of social capital, measured by membership in community 
organizations, following the disasters. While these studies have captured brief dips in the 
behavioral component of social capital, given the long time span between the disasters and the 
second WVS study, I do not expect that brief dip to play a significant role in the data studied 
here.  
I expect to see increases in membership in all of the groups examined, which include 
religious, environmental, charitable, and mutual aid organizations. This is because these 
organizations perform important functions following disasters, including hurricanes. Due to the 
increased need for these organizations in the aftermath of a disaster, they are the most likely 
recipients of any increase in organizational participation. For this reason, I selected them to study 
in this thesis.  
Charitable and mutual aid organizations’ missions are directly linked to the needs of a 
community post disaster, which often requires medical, financial, and legal assistance both in the 
immediate aftermath and during recovery. Religious organizations often function in a similar 
capacity following disasters. Stout (2010) highlights the importance of religious organizing in 
New Orleans during the recovery following Hurricane Katrina.  
Environmental organizations may see an increase due to a drive to combat climate 
change or to conserve wetlands. This concern about climate change may stem from the 
connection between climate change and these disasters made in the media (Smith, 2019; Pant & 
Cha, 2019; Kaplan, 2020). On the conservation end, preserving wetlands is important in 
preventing flooding, which is a major risk during hurricanes (EPA, 2018).  
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Moreover, I expect to see social trust increase following the disasters. My expectation is 
that trust will increase across its various measures following the disasters. General trust has been 
shown to increase following disasters, as they increase in intensity and in harm to the community 
especially in instances of predictable community-wide disasters (Toya & Skidmore, 2014). I 
expect this generalized trust to extend to trust in people generally and trust in those the 
respondents just met. Those who experience disasters often rely on close relations to provide 
housing, financial, and other kinds of assistance (Reid & Reczek, 2011; Lu et al., 2020). Because 
close relations, like neighbors and those the respondents know well, are important to disaster 
recovery, I expect to see trust in these areas increase as well.  
 
METHODS 
 To investigate these predictions, I compare 
social capital development in regions of the US 
affected by hurricanes to the parts of the US that 
have not experienced those storms. By separating 
out the areas affected by the storms in question from 
the areas not affected, I am able to discern whether 
and to what extent different dimensions of social 
capital change in the aftermath of disasters. 
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I chose Hurricane Irene, Hurricane Sandy, 
and Hurricane Matthew to study. Both Irene and 
Sandy were category 3 hurricanes, and Matthew was 
a category 5 (North Carolina Climate Office, 2020). 
Each of these hurricanes recorded the highest top 
windspeed and lowest pressure of any hurricanes or 
tropical storms that hit the mainland US in their 
respective years (North Carolina Climate Office, 
2020).  Hurricane Sandy (Oct. 2012) is the 4th 
costliest hurricane in the US on record, and 
Hurricanes Irene (Aug. 2011) and Matthew (Sept. 
2016) rank 12th and 13th respectively (National 
Hurricane Center, 2018). From these metrics, these 
storms stand out as particularly impactful extreme 
weather events.  
Critically for my study, these storms fell between the Wave 6 and Wave 7 survey from 
the World Values Survey (WVS), which collected data in the US in between June and July 2011 
and between April and May 2017 on a variety of beliefs, values, and practices of the respondents 
(Inglehart et al., 2014; Haerpfer et al., 2020).3 The dates of other surveys that might have been 
used, such as the National Election Survey, do not allow for comparisons of before and after any 
 
3 As stated earlier, the WVS Wave 6 and Wave 7 data were published online in 2014 and 2020 respectively, but the 
US data was collected in 2011 and 2017 for each wave. 
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of these storms. Additionally, given the time constrains on this work, I could not wait for a 
severe disaster to administer my own questionnaire to more carefully target affected areas.  
While I have not encountered other research that has utilized the WVS, its emphasis on 
values and attitudes is what drew me to it to assess social capital. The WVS is a social survey 
administered worldwide to assess individuals’ values and their impact on political and social 
spheres. Its focus on individual-level beliefs in connection to larger political trends makes it 
relevant for my study. It seeks to collect data over time to measure a range of socioeconomic and 
political phenomena, including social capital. Critically for my study, the WVS allows me to 
examine state-level data from the US, making it possible to compare unaffected and affected 
states. 
To assess which states to collect data on from the WVS, I found which states had either 
emergency declarations or major disaster declarations, based on records from the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Both Governors’ orders and the President’s orders 
were accepted. Based on this, the areas identified to study for the three hurricanes are: 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, 
Virginia, Washington D.C., and West Virginia (FEMA, 2011; FEMA, 2012; FEMA, 2016). 
These areas make up what I term ‘affected’ areas. Using a rough experimental design, I intend to 
explore the development of social capital in these ‘affected’ areas, relative to its development in 
areas not affected by these hurricanes. All US states not affected by these storms make up what I 
term ‘unaffected’ areas. Notably, some of the affected states were affected by more than one 
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hurricane, which allows me to explore changes in social capital in areas hit especially hard by 
hurricanes.4  
Evidently, hurricanes do not impact the entirety of every state included in the affected 
group, and not every state in the unaffected group is immune to hurricanes or other types of 
disasters. While I use gubernatorial and presidential disaster declarations to determine the states 
that were most at risk of significant impact, not all regions of states experienced the same effects, 
but all were included under those orders. This is one limitation of the data used here. To 
counteract this, I utilize a case study approach in a later section to provide more detail about a 
specific area significantly and directly affected by a disaster.  
For this data, I used the online analysis available on the WVS’ webpage to access the 
results for the US by the state, which are listed as percentages. I took the results for each state 
and weighted it by the number of respondents from that state in order to create a representative 
total for the affected area. This was done for all of the states and D.C. that were affected by a 
storm at least once. I repeated this with the states that were hit twice or more. The areas hit twice 
or more include Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington D.C. I was 
unable to repeat this for the area hit by all three storms due to an insufficient sample size. 
Virginia was the only place affected by all three hurricanes as identified in my methodology and 
had only 55 respondents in 2011 and 68 in 2017. Similarly, I did not compare areas affected by 
only one storm because there was a relatively small sample size for states only affected by one 
 
4 In order to provide a more in-depth comparison of the affected and unaffected areas, I pulled out the data for gulf 
states unaffected by these hurricanes (Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) and followed the same weighting 
procedure. The results of this comparison showed that these states aggregated together followed a pattern most 
similar to the larger unaffected regions. Due to this, information about these states is not analyzed here but can be 
found in the appendices.  
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storm.  Like I did for the averages in the affected region, I aggregated each unaffected state’s 
response to each question related to social capital by weighting it by the number of WVS 
participants in the state.  
I chose to analyze areas affected by at least one storm and affected by two or more to be 
able to more closely examine the effect of storms compared to unaffected areas. Even though 
finding a relationship between the number of storms experienced and social capital is not my 
main objective, it is a useful way to draw out the relationship between disasters and social 
capital.  
The sample size in the WVS allows me to access a large pool of respondents. Overall, the 
total respondents in the affected area hit by at least one storm in 2011 were 856 and in 2017 were 
980 (Inglehart, 2014). For the areas hit by two or more storms there were 571 in 2011 and 692 in 
2017. The total numbers in 2011 and 2017 for the unaffected regions of the US were 1,376 and 
1,619 respectively (Haerpfer, 2020). Overall, the total number of respondents whose answers are 
analyzed here are 2,232 in 2011 and 2,596 in 2017.  
My research incorporates divergent views of social capital in my attitudinal and 
behavioral framework by using WVS data to assess these dimensions of social capital. I capture 
notions of Bourdieu’s idea of “actual or potential” resource in questions pertaining to how close 
the respondents feel to their local community.5 I repeated a similar process for questions about 
closeness to their country and to the world to use as a comparison to the local community. Social 
 
5 The questions in this area change wording between the two waves of the survey. In 2011, the questions ask if the 
respondents feel like citizens or members of their local community. For this question I combined the percentages 
who selected agree or strongly agree. In 2017, the questions ask if the respondents feel close to the local community. 
For this question I combined the percentages who selected close or very close. 
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capital is a localized phenomenon, but by comparing how feelings of closeness change in 
different settings will show a clearer picture of the trends at play.  
To measure the organizational membership component brought up by Coleman (1988) 
and Putnam (1993), I used questions from the WVS that pertained to membership in a variety of 
organizations, including religious, environmental, charitable/humanitarian, and self-help/mutual 
aid. I combined the percentage of active and inactive members. The WVS also collects data on 
how frequently the respondents attend religious services. I used their data to measure the 
percentage of respondents who attend once per month or more frequently.  
Finally, I used questions from the WVS about how much the respondents trust their 
neighbors, those they know well, those they just met, and people generally. These questions 
capture Putnam’s (1993) conception of social capital as trust that fuels norms of reciprocity. For 
these questions, I measured the percentage who completely or somewhat trust their neighbors, 
those they know well, and those they just met. For trust in people generally, I measured the 
percentage who responded that most people can be trusted.  
My analysis examines whether and how social capital development, as measured by 
responses to questions about different dimensions of social capital, changed in both the affected 
and unaffected areas. The affected regions in effect represent a treatment group, while the 
unaffected region serves as a control group. Comparing patters of social capital development 
between the two will offer insight into how social capital changes as a result of disasters.  
In addition to visually comparing trends for the different indices of social capital between 
the two regions, I ran difference of proportion tests between and within them. First, I used this 
test to assess whether there were statistically significant changes within each region between 
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2011 and 2017. This allowed me to discern whether the affected regions witnessed more 
dramatic changes in social capital development than the unaffected region. Second, I examined 
whether there were statistically significant differences between the affected regions and the 
unaffected regions both in 2011 and 2017. The premise here was that if hurricanes were affecting 
social capital development, differences between the affected and unaffected regions should be 
more apparent in 2017.   
Given that the statistics in question are proportions and the variables being examined are 
two categorical variables (geographical location and agreement with the statement), using a 
difference of proportion makes the most sense.6 I am able to use a normal distribution to 
approximate the spread of the responses since this data complies with the central limit theorem. 
This theorem states that np ≥ 10 and n(1 - p) ≥ 10, where n is the number of cases and p is the 
proportion in question (Lock et al., 2017). All responses included in this research satisfy the 
requirements of the central limit theorem, falling within the bounds identified by this theorem, 
seen in Appendix A.7   
I tested the null hypothesis that there would be no difference between the two proportions 
being compared for each test. Given the ambiguity in the literature, I tested the alternative 
hypothesis that the proportions would not be equal, using a two-tailed test rather than assuming 
the results will go in one direction or the other. While my hypotheses more closely resemble a 
left tailed test, my initial analysis revealed interesting trends in the data that are both in line with 
the literature and unable to be captured in a left tailed test. Many highly unusual test statistics 
 
6 In the case of frequency of attendance at religious services, the variables remain categorical, as the respondents did 
not write in the number of times in a given period that they attend but rather selected “once per week,” “once per 
month,” “on important holidays,” etc. 
7 Further information on the central limit theorem and the bounds for this research can be found in the appendices. 
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were present, but they can only be captured with a two tailed test due to falling at the extreme 
opposite of my initial hypotheses. When using a left tailed test, this led to p-values of 1.00 
despite the statistics being extreme outliers. Having observed this, I concluded that my initial 
hypotheses were incorrect and pivoted to examine the interesting trends presented in the data. I 
felt this was more appropriate than deliberately ignoring clear and interesting results in favor of 
my incorrect initial hypotheses, particularly considering the well-documented ambiguity in the 
literature. An added benefit of the two tailed test is its increased rigor for statistical significance. 
 
FINDINGS 
CONNECTION WITH COMMUNITY 
 This section examines how close 
respondents reported feeling to their local 
community. It seems far more likely that a 
community affected by a disaster will 
feel an increased need to band 
together with others compared to 
an unaffected community, resulting 
in increased closeness in the 
affected community. For reference, 
I will also compare these findings to any changes in feelings of closeness to the US and to the 
world. The purpose of this is to explore if those affected by storms feel closer overall to different 
Fig. 4 
Table 1 
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groups generally or if this trend can be attributed to the interaction between social capital, 
disasters, and the local community.8  
While I expected to see 
increasing feelings of closeness 
with the local community in 
affected regions, as seen in Figure 
4, such feelings decreased across 
all three groups: the unaffected 
regions of the US, states hit once 
or more by a storm, and states hit 
twice or more. However, the data 
shows that while feelings of 
closeness declined across the 
board, the areas affected by these hurricanes declined significantly less than the unaffected 
regions. The distance between the affected states and the unaffected states widened from around 
2 to 3% in 2011 to more than 10% points of difference in 2017 (Table 1). This suggests that 
experiencing disasters creates a protective effect against decreasing feelings of closeness to the 
local community.  
Notably, this buttressed feeling of closeness in the affected regions is not replicated to the 
same extent in responses to other questions about closeness to the US and to the world. As the 
 
8 The results for the comparison of the unaffected gulf states demonstrates that this area experienced a drop in 
feelings of closeness in between that of the affected and unaffected regions. This indicates some potential level of 
general protection for areas affected by hurricanes against declines in community closeness. See the appendices for 
more information.  
Table 2 
Table 3 
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scope of the area in question becomes more local- moving from world-wide to nation-wide to 
community-wide-, the larger the divergence in outcomes between the affected and unaffected 
areas becomes. In terms of how close the respondents felt to the world, there is no clear pattern 
amongst the three groups analyzed. States hit twice or more decrease the least, while states hit 
once or more decrease the most and the unaffected areas’ magnitude of decline is in the middle 
(Table 3). For feelings about the US, the distance between the two affected groups and the US 
grew between 2011 and 2017, but not dramatically so (Table 2). While people in all regions 
reported decreases in closeness to different groups, the affected areas were more resistant to 
decreases in feelings of closeness to more localized groups.  
The difference of proportions test supports this conclusion, indicating that the differences 
in closeness to the community are not the result of chance. At the 99% level, the two affected 
areas have statistically significant differences from the unaffected areas in 2017 whereas in 2011 
this was not the case (Table 1).  
It appears then that my third hypothesis is somewhat affirmed by this analysis. I predicted 
an outright increase in feelings of closeness, which did not happen. However, the data indicates 
that experiencing a disaster buttresses feelings of connection with local communities against 
forces that would otherwise undermine them. This may be a result of experiencing a need to rely 
on communities for aid following disasters. The strength of the effect of a disaster on closeness 
to local communities is evidence of a direct link to social capital, indicating a reduced rate of 
decreasing capital than the region would otherwise have experienced. As social capital is a 
localized phenomenon, the fact that this pattern is seen most prominently in the local context 
when compared to the national and international contexts supports that there is a protective effect 
of living in an area affected by a disaster on this aspect of social capital.  




The organizations I examined are 
religious, environmental, 
charitable/humanitarian, and self-
help/mutual aid organizations. While I 
expected to see increases in membership 
in the affected regions, most of these 
organizations saw declines in 
membership. The organizations that saw 
consistent declines in membership from 
the affected regions are environmental 
organizations and charitable/humanitarian 
organizations. Both religious and mutual 
aid/self-help organizations displayed 
mixed results for the regions hit by one or 
more hurricanes and the regions hit by 
two or more.  
While my expectations were 
overall incorrect, there still are multiple 
discernable patterns that shed light on the 
relationship between disasters and behavioral social capital in this data. The results for 
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demonstrate that there is a 
relationship between membership and 
experiencing disasters. The trends 
presented in the affected regions are 
distinct from the unaffected region’s 
trends. Only the trends in membership 
in religious organizations did not provide evidence of a distinct relationship between 
membership and disasters.   
As Figure 5 reveals, membership in environmental organizations appears to be negatively 
related to experiencing hurricanes, a pattern that stands in opposition to my initial expectations 
(Fig. 5). While the unaffected region’s membership rate grew 3.1%, the two areas affected by the 
storms saw membership declines of just under 1% each (Table 4). As both affected regions 
moved in the opposite direction from the US, there is evidence to suggest that experiencing 
hurricanes actually decreases participation in environmental organizations. This may be 
attributable to limited time and resources following a disaster.  
While the small decrease in the affected regions is not statistically significant, the 
increase in the unaffected region is, affirming the divergent outcomes between these groups, 
again, in contrast to my expectations. While this does not conclusively say that the changes 
experienced by the affected region are not the product of chance alone, the statistical significance 
of the increased membership in the unaffected region suggests that there is a specific impetus 
causing its increase. In contrast, the affected region saw a slight decline, which despite being 
statistically insignificant suggests that it was not affected by this impetus. Taken together, this 
presents evidence that there is a relationship between not experiencing a disaster and 
Table 4 
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membership in environmental organizations. It is possible that this is a result of those not 
adversely affected by a disaster being able to invest time and money into increasingly visible and 
mainstream environmental causes in ways that those affected by a disaster may not.  
The comparative lack of 
participation among those in the 
affected group cannot be attributed to 
apathy towards the environment. Even 
though all three disasters were 
connected to climate change in the 
media (Nusca, 2011; Corell 2012; Sutter, 2016), this did not appear to spur a jump in 
participation like I had expected. This suggests that those affected by these storms feel less 
inclined to participate in such organizations. Notably, this is true despite citizens in the affected 
regions being concerned overall with climate change and the environment. Every county in the 
affected region reports at least 45% of adults being concerned about global warming, with many 
counties ranking as the most concerned in the US, at around 80% being concerned (Marlon et al., 
2020). Consequently, this observed decrease in membership cannot be attributed to apathy 
towards the environment on the part of the residents of this area, making it seem more 
attributable to a depressive effect of disasters on social capital.  
Also standing in contrast to my initial expectations are the findings with respect to 
membership in charitable and humanitarian organizations. Membership in these organizations 
appears to be negatively correlated to experiencing a disaster (Fig. 6). Both affected areas saw 
declines in membership while the unaffected area saw an increase of 3.4% (Table 5). This 
Table 5 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DISASTERS                                                                                     40 
 
suggests that behavioral social capital is decreasing as those affected may feel less inclined or 
less able to support others and share their resources.  
Similar to environmental 
organizations’ membership, only the 
unaffected region saw a statistically 
significant change in membership in 
charitable organizations following a 
difference of proportions test (Table 
5). Again, while this test only provides more information about the unaffected region, the 
diverging trends in membership between the affected and unaffected regions combined with 
statistical significance only for the unaffected region points to a negative relationship between 
experiencing a disaster and membership in a charitable or humanitarian organization. At very 
least, the affected region is left out of the impetus generating more membership in the unaffected 
region.  
Membership in mutual aid and self-help organizations follows a contrasting pattern to the 
one observed with charitable and humanitarian organizations. As Figure 7 indicates, membership 
in mutual aid and self-help organizations decreased markedly in the unaffected regions, but the 
affected areas did not see steep declines and even witnessed increases. While the unaffected 
areas saw a decline of 8.9% in membership, the area hit by one or more storms saw a decline of 
0.8% and the area hit by two or more saw an increase of 2.2% (Table 6). This suggests an 
additive effect of experiencing multiple hurricanes and a protective effect of experiencing at least 
one. 
Table 6 
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A difference of proportions 
test affirms that the above trends are 
not the result of chance. Most 
significantly, only the unaffected 
region saw a statistically significant 
decrease in mutual aid and self-help 
membership between 2011 and 2017 
(Table 6).9  Meanwhile, the affected 
areas did not react in the way the 
unaffected areas did. This supports 
that experiencing a disaster likely 
mitigated the larger trends in the US from occurring in the affected area. As I suggest below, this 
makes sense given the importance of these organizations in the wake of disasters.10 
Finally, looking at religious organizations’ membership, the affected areas move in 
diverging directions. The areas hit by one or more storms decrease at a slightly less steep rate 
than the unaffected region, dropping 3.1%, whereas the area hit by two or more storms increased 
by almost 0.5% (Table 7). Between 2011 and 2017, the area hit by at least one storm and the area 
hit by two or more storms grew less similar. Given that the area hit by one or more storms and 
the unaffected areas saw membership decline a similar amount, there does not appear to be a 
 
9 Since the participation rates were dramatically different between the affected and unaffected areas in 2011, the 
difference between those rates is significant but does not inform this analysis. As the diverging changes brought the 
rates closer together in 2017, only the difference between the area hit by one or more storms and the unaffected 
areas is statistically significant. 
10 The larger aggregate numbers demonstrate diverging patterns based on experiencing or not experiencing a 
hurricane, but the data on the unaffected gulf states indicates that this increase in the affected regions is not 
necessarily more than within unaffected sub-groups in all individual cases. For example, the unaffected gulf states 
saw a larger increase in self-help/mutual aid membership than the affected areas. See more in the appendix. 
Table 7 
Table 8 
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relationship between experiencing a disaster and participation in religious organizations. There 
may be a small effect of experiencing multiple hurricanes, as the area hit by two or more storms 
saw a slight increase in membership.  
Like many of the other organizations, only membership in religious organizations in the 
unaffected region saw a statistically significant decline (Table 7). However, unlike the other 
areas this does not sufficiently help to prove that there is a relationship between experiencing a 
hurricane and organizational membership. This is because the region hit by at least one storm 
saw a similar decline in membership even though it is not statistically significant, likely due to 
the smaller sample size. Tellingly, the difference between each affected area and the unaffected 
areas remains statistically insignificant in 2017 as it was in 2011. Taking all of this into account, 
there is no reason to believe that there is a distinct phenomenon at play in the unaffected regions, 
meaning there does not appear to be a relationship between experiencing a hurricane and 
religious organizational membership.   
When looking at frequency of religious service attendance, there is no clear pattern here 
as well. All three groups saw declines in attendance rates, with the area hit by two or more 
storms and the unaffected region decreasing at almost the same rate (Table 8). Additionally, the 
are hit by at least one storm grew more like the unaffected region between 2011 and 2017. Taken 
together, there is little reason to believe there is a relationship here between experiencing a 
disaster and frequency of religious attendance. Given that the similar declines in attendance, this 
suggests that the declines in attendance are caused by the same factor, but this factor is not 
experiencing a disaster. The difference of proportions test confirms this lack of a connection. The 
area hit by two or more storms and the unaffected areas both have statistically significant 
decreases in attendance frequency between 2011 and 2017 (Table 8).  




 Trust is a central component of 
social capital, creating norms of 
reciprocity that allow networks to function 
and create a civic and prosperous 
community (Putnam 1993; Putnam 2001). 
In order to measure the level of trust in 
the affected areas, I looked at how much 
the respondents to the WVS reported 
trusting people generally, those they know 
well, their neighbors, and those they just 
met. This attempts to get at multiple 
levels of trust from strangers to close 
relationships. I anticipated an increase in 
trust within the regions affected by the 
hurricanes.  
 Overall, this data confirms my 
expectations, with almost all of the types 
of trust in affected areas seeing increases 
much larger than the unaffected regions. 
This indicates a buttressing and bolstering of trust-related social capital within the affected 
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allows trust in this region to weather 
factors causing a nation-wide fall and to 
grow more when the factors cause a 
national increase. Only trust in those the 
respondents know personally saw a slight 
decrease, which is a smaller decrease than 
the unaffected areas of the US saw.  
On the question of trust in people generally, there is a strong correlation between 
increasing trust and living in a region that experienced a hurricane (Fig. 8). While the non-
affected regions of the US experienced a slight increase in general trust of 0.8%, both affected 
regions saw nearly identical increases that are significantly larger than the non-affected regions 
(Table 9). The area hit by at least one storm saw an increase of 4.3% and the area hit by two or 
more saw an increase of 4.1%.   
Although the data suggests a link between increasing generalized trust and experiencing 
one or more hurricanes, a test for statistical significance reveals that chance cannot be ruled out 
as the root cause (Table 9). None of the differences in percentages yield a value that allows me to 
be more than 95% certain that the observed result is not the product of chance alone, although 
some are close to this threshold.   
 Consistent with the patterns detailed above, trust in neighbors saw slight increases in the 
affected region while it dropped off significantly in the unaffected areas (Fig. 9). The unaffected 
areas saw a decrease of 4.5%, while the area affected by at least one storm saw an increase of 
0.8% and the area affected by two or more increased 0.3% (Table 10). This indicates that 
Fig. 11 
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experiencing a hurricane 
increases trust in 
neighbors and protects 
against forces within the 
country that may 
otherwise have reduced 
this kind of trust.  
As only the 
unaffected region 
experienced a statistically 
significant change, this 
affirms that the affected 
and unaffected groups are 
experiencing different 
trends in regards to trust in 
neighbors. Even though 
the difference in 2017, 
unlike 2011, between the 
affected and unaffected 
groups is insignificant, 
this does not undermine 
this conclusion, as the 
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opposing changes in levels of trust that bring their levels of trust closer together (Table 10). 
Based on this pattern, it appears likely that those who experienced these storms had positive 
experiences with their neighbors that resulted in a slightly higher level of trust and buttressed this 
against the forces that lowered the US’ overall level of trust.   
While trust in those the respondents know personally did see a decrease in the affected 
regions, this decline is much smaller than in the unaffected areas of the US (Fig. 10). This 
suggests a protective effect on this kind of trust from experiencing a hurricane. While the 
unaffected region saw a decline in reported trust of 3.8%, the area hit by at least one storm saw a 
decrease of 0.4% and the area hit by two or more saw a decline of 2.2% (Table 11). This 
suggests a u-shaped relationship between the number of storms experienced and trust. This 
indicates that the protective effect that held trust in close relations steady after one storm may 
break down after repeated storms. As individuals often rely on close connections to weather hard 
times, it is possible that these close relations become overly stressed after multiple large storms, 
potentially leading to unmet expectations that reduce trust after repeated strain. In contrast, those 
only experiencing one storm may not place as much strain on those relationships, preventing 
unmet expectations that may lower trust. 
Based on the statistical significance for the change in trust in the unaffected region and 
the difference between 2011 and 2017, the above explanation makes sense (Table 11). This 
statistically significant change led to the area hit by one or more to differ in a statistically 
significant way in 2017 from the unaffected region. This further confirms that they are 
experiencing diverging phenomenon, driven by experiencing or not experiencing a disaster. The 
similar decline in trust in the area hit by two or more storms and its lack of statistically 
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significant difference from the unaffected region in 2017 suggests that the strain explanation may 
be accurate.  
 Finally, figure 11 indicates that trust in those the respondents just met has a strong 
relationship to experiencing a hurricane. Both the area affected by one or more storms and the 
area affected by two or more saw increases in such trust around 10% while the unaffected areas’ 
level of trust remained relatively stable, declining 0.3% (Table 12). This suggests that 
experiencing at least one hurricane increases the level of trust in strangers significantly more 
than in areas not affected by a hurricane. During and after disasters, individuals often need to 
rely on the aid of strangers, through the National Guard and other governmental groups, various 
civic organizations, or through informal emergent groups. Positive experiences in this area may 
increase the baseline level of trust individuals have towards those they just met and explain this 
observed phenomenon. This suggests that those affected by the storms were not disappointed by 
their interactions with others during and after these disasters.  
 A test for statistical significance affirms that the change in trust in strangers is attributable 
to experiencing a disaster. Only the two affected groups experienced statistically significant 
changes in levels of trust between 2011 and 2017 (Table 12). Additionally, the difference 
between each affected group and the unaffected group in 2017 is statistically significant. This 
indicates that prior to the storms, there was no statistically significant difference in all three 
groups not attributable to chance alone. However, following these storms, the two affected 
groups saw statistically significant increases in trust, leading them to then diverge in a 
statistically significant way from the unaffected region.  
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DISCUSSION  
Overall, there was a diversity of outcomes for the three measures of social capital studied 
here, which reflects the wide range of relationships between social capital and disasters 
documented in the literature. Attitudinal social capital, operationalized in this study by feelings 
of closeness and trust, was buttressed against the overall declines in those areas across the board 
in the US in some cases and in others saw outright increases not replicated elsewhere. 
Organizational membership did not display a clear pattern across all organizations considered, 
however the affected region saw more decreases in membership compared to the unaffected 
areas. The one exception was the slight increase in membership in mutual aid organizations. This 
indicates an overall weakening of behavioral social capital in the affected region relative to the 
unaffected region. Thus, attitudinal social capital increased or resisted declining while behavioral 
social capital decreased overall. This suggests that social capital does not react uniformly to 
disasters. 
The observed increases in trust and feelings of closeness to the local community indicate a 
rise in social capital that is seemingly contradicted by the decline in the affected area’s 
membership in community organizations. These disparate outcomes appear to be in conflict with 
Putnam’s (1993) central tenant that generalized trust and civic participation go hand in hand, 
creating a mutually reinforcing virtuous cycle. How could individuals feel at once closer to and 
more trusting of the local community yet participate in it less? Particularly given the declines in 
charitable, humanitarian, and religious organizational membership, it seems odd that individuals 
would feel more trusting and closer to others and yet give less.  
There are several possible explanations in the literature for this observed pattern. The first 
is the rent gap theory, where disasters exacerbate inequalities and open opportunities for disaster 
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capitalism that force those with low incomes out of areas affected by disasters (Derickson, 2013; 
Wyczalkowski et al., 2019). A longitudinal study of the Houston-Galveston area after hurricane 
damage supports the rent-gap theory of recovery, where low SES residents are displaced 
following the hurricane (Wyczalkowski et al., 2019). Following this logic, those who can easily 
meet their needs following a disaster are more likely to remain in the area and also face fewer 
incentives to become more involved in community organizations. In contrast, those who would 
rely on such organizations- and therefore have incentives to participate in them- are forced out.  
While the rent gap explanation has been shown to be in effect following Hurricane Sandy 
(Chun, 2015), this does not explain the trends observed in this research. Even if this were at 
work, it would not prevent those pushed out of their local community from being captured in the 
WVS data given the large geographic area covered by the survey. It seems implausible that those 
forced out would relocate in large numbers to an entirely different region of the country rather 
than to a different neighborhood of their local area. To capture this data specifically, there needs 
to be analysis of neighborhood-level data, which is not analyzed here due to the limitations of the 
WVS data.  
A second possible explanation is that spontaneous emergent group networks satisfy 
individuals’ needs following a disaster, decreasing their reliance on formal organizations. In this 
case, individuals might not feel a need to band together to find ways to provision resources or aid 
as they would if they felt that was lacking. This would raise the collective efficacy of the 
community, decreasing the need to participate in traditional organizations while raising trust in 
others and feelings of closeness to the community due to the belief that the community can rise 
to the challenge of another disaster. Emergent group behavior and identities have been 
extensively documented following disasters, especially in the age of social media (Rodríguez et 
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al, 2006; Albris, 2018; Schuenemann, 2020; Cheng & Mitomo, 2018; Wilensky, 2014; Lowe & 
Fothergill, 2003). This may be what creates the belief in the community’s ability to respond that 
facilitate higher levels of trust and connection with the community despite the decreasing 
participation in key formal organizations.  
The emergent group behavior explanation appears to better explain the trend here than 
the rent gap theory and resolves the seeming conflict between my findings in part because of the 
increase in mutual aid membership. The spontaneous nature of emergent behavior makes it 
difficult to capture and study. However, based on the observed increase in membership in mutual 
aid organizations for the areas hit by two or more storms, there is some concrete evidence that 
this explanation is at work here. Mutual aid networks tend to be more informal in nature than 
charitable organizations, meaning the observed increase may be indicative of a larger reliance on 
emergent networks of aid following disasters. This might add dimension to the explanation for 
why there was not a larger increase in group membership. Many other types of groups are more 
unidirectional, making them potentially less attractive to those both in need of aid and looking to 
work with community members.  
Diving further into the diverging outcomes for charitable and mutual aid organizations’ 
membership, the reciprocal structure of mutual aid networks may explain why they are seeing 
increases in the affected area not found for charitable organizations. Whereas charitable 
organizations are unidirectional in terms of who is giving and receiving aid, mutual aid networks 
operate in a reciprocal fashion (Whitfield et al., 2020). Charitable and humanitarian 
organizations require there to be well-off givers who provide resources for those who are less 
well-off to use. This model may be less sustainable in a local context following intense, large-
scale disasters where there are fewer individuals to give in this way.  
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One weakness of this argument is the research that suggests that many who 
spontaneously engage in pro-social behavior will continue to be involved in the long-term 
following the disaster (Lowe & Fothergill, 2003; Steffen & Fothergill, 2009). If this were to be 
the case, it seems less likely that emergent group behavior would remain undetected by the WVS 
in a way that explains the contradictions between the decreasing behavioral component and 
increasing attitudinal components of social capital. Alternatively, those who engage in informal 
pro-social group behavior may not report themselves as members, even if it does persist over a 
longer period, which would be consistent with my findings.  
Other research suggests that the emergent groups formed during a disaster are susceptible 
to erosion once the event is over (Schuenemann, 2020), which makes sense given emergent 
group identities are framed around the shared sense of fate emerging from facing a new danger 
(Ntontis et al., 2018) and therefore may have little reason to persist in non-disaster times. 
Additionally, emergent group pro-social behavior may still be contingent on an individual’s pre-
existing stock of social capital (Cheng & Mitomo, 2018), meaning this observed trend may not 
be as uniform across the affected region as this data suggests. Despite these nuances, there is 
evidence to support an emergent behavior-based explanation of the seemingly contradictory 
findings on social capital in this paper.  
Another factor which may be promoting high levels of trust and feelings of closeness to 
the local community without a corresponding rise in organizational participation may be the role 
of government aid and intervention. Wickes et al. (2015) found that social capital was not as 
important for community resilience following floods in Australia in part due to the robust 
governmental intervention. Given the high marks and relative bipartisanship of the responses to 
the three hurricanes studied here (Rasmussen Reports, 2011; Mali, 2012; Hart, 2014; Stein, 
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2016), it seems plausible that this explanation also plays a role in the observed pattern in this 
data. A strong government response may mitigate the extent to which individuals feel the need to 
get involved to promote effective responses to disasters while allowing their faith in a robust 
response from the community to remain high. In order to investigate this possible explanation 
further, there needs to be a study of the feelings of those affected by these disasters towards 
governmental institutions.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 My findings align with the existing ambiguities in the literature on disasters and social 
capital. However, it also presents evidence that may help to make sense of these contrasting 
conclusions. My findings demonstrate the variety of outcomes documented in the literature on 
social capital, with some dimensions of social capital seeing increases while others decreased. 
The contraction between increasing attitudinal social capital with behavioral capital decreasing is 
potentially explained by two scenarios. In the first, emergent behavior is important in the 
response to the storms, leading to the corresponding behavioral social capital being unaccounted 
for in the organizational data used here. The second is that effective government intervention 
mitigated the need for organizational responses to the disasters, allowing this positive response to 
raise attitudinal social capital while avoiding a need for further organizational involvement. Both 
of these explanations have foundations in the literature on social capital and are plausible but 
require further research to confirm or discount.  
My findings on mutual aid and self-help organizations suggest that this seeming 
contradiction may be explained by spontaneous emergent aid networks following disasters. 
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Putnam himself writes about the importance of mutual aid networks towards the creation of 
social capital (1993, p. 169). Regardless of the specific explanation for this divergence of 
outcomes for social capital following Hurricane Irene, Hurricane Sandy, and Hurricane Matthew, 
these findings affirm that social capital does not react uniformly to disasters. As a result, some 
types of social capital may increase following a disaster while others might decrease. For 
example, formal membership does not necessarily correlate to trust or closeness.   
Both potential explanations listed above will be evaluated more in the next section 
through an analysis of news stories in a key affected city. I will seek to utilize a case study 
approach to situate this research in a specific context to determine if either explanation holds up. 
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CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY OF HOBOKEN, NJ 
  
This section will examine patterns and developments in Hoboken, NJ with two aims in 
mind. The first is to assess whether patterns of social capital development in the city were 
consistent with the findings from the earlier quantitative analysis and provide illustrations of 
those patterns. The second is to use the information from the case study of Hoboken to evaluate 
the potential explanations for one of the more striking findings from that quantitative 
analysis. As indicated in the previous section, attitudinal and behavioral social capital followed 
different patterns in affected areas. While attitudinal social capital saw either a buttressing effect 
following the storms or outright increases, behavioral social capital primarily saw declines. 
Through the case study of this city, I will evaluate these explanations. One focuses on the role of 
government intervention, and the other focuses on informal group behavior. 
One advantage of this case study approach is that it allows me to focus specifically on an 
area that was significantly impacted by a hurricane. While the previous section focused on 
finding large-scale trends, this section does not seek to make broad claims. It instead aims to 
evaluate if the potential explanations posited in the previous section have any explanatory power 
in the context of a particular case.  
In an attempt to counterbalance large generalizations of the previous section, I will use 
this qualitative section to narrowly focus in on key areas significantly impacted by the storms in 
question. The rough experimental design of the previous section separated all states in the US 
into either the affected or the unaffected group. However, clearly delineating areas impacted and 
not at all impacted by these storms is inherently imprecise, as there is a gradual decline in the 
severity of storms out from their epicenters. The state-wide areas included in the affected region 
were not uniformly impacted by these storms. Additionally, the areas that make up the 
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unaffected region are not uniformly unimpacted by hurricanes and natural disasters themselves, 
and they are not a homogenous group. Given that the data set I used measures state-level data, 
this presents one methodological limitation to my study that I will attempt to counterbalance with 
this case study.  
 
REVISITING THE PUZZLE & EXPECTATIONS 
 While Putnam (1993) saw social capital as operating within virtuous or vicious cycles, 
where trust and group cooperation mutually inform one another, the data I analyzed from the 
WVS showed changes in behavioral social capital diverging from changes in attitudinal. 
Generally, feelings of trust in others increased. Feelings of closeness to the community did 
decrease, however they decreased significantly less than in the unaffected regions. This 
represents a buttressing of feelings of connection associated with experiencing a disaster. These 
two findings are in line with Putnam’s theory. However, participation in most community 
organizations declined. It makes little sense to think that individuals could trust the local 
community more and feel closer to their local community than those in unaffected regions and 
yet also not participate in community efforts to rebuild after a disaster. But this was what the data 
in the previous section appeared to demonstrate. The only exception to the trend of declining 
participation in community organizations came from mutual aid/self-help organizations in areas 
affected by two or more hurricanes. This kind of organization saw a slight increase in 
membership.  
There were two potential explanations for the seeming contradiction between the results 
in attitudinal and behavioral social capital: informal group behavior and government 
intervention. The first explanation is that there was an increase in participation, but it was in 
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informal groups. This possibility stems from the finding that the one type of organization that 
saw an increase in participation, mutual aid/self-help groups, is distinctly more informal than 
most other organizations. The rationale regarding the second explanation is that government 
intervention may provide the basis for increased trust and connection by adequately responding 
to a disaster without requiring organizational participation. These two potential explanations will 
be explored in this section in the case study of Hoboken, NJ.  
 Building from this first explanation, I anticipate that the analysis of developments in 
Hoboken following Hurricane Sandy will reveal an increase in informal pro-social group 
behavior. This would resolve the contradiction between my findings, since individuals would 
have participated more in the local community following the storm. This seems plausible, 
especially in light of the increase in membership in self-help organizations. But because this 
participation was informal, it might not have been recorded in the WVS’ data, explaining the 
divergence between attitudinal and behavioral social capital in the data section.  
For example, individuals who worked together to share and distribute resources within a 
neighborhood during a disaster may not consider themselves part of a group and therefore not 
report in a survey that they are members of an organization. Additionally, there is reason to 
believe that groups formed during a disaster might dissipate over time (Ntontis et al., 2018), so 
group behavior during a storm might not persist long enough for respondents to report 
themselves being part of a group during a survey some time later. Informal, potentially short-
term group cooperation during a disaster might not be registering in questions about membership 
in organizations. Alternatively, feeling satisfied with the results of a recovery generated by 
informal group behavior would present little incentive for residents to become members in 
formal organizations.  
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 My second hypothesis is derived from the government-centered explanation from the 
previous section. I anticipate that the analysis of developments in Hoboken will reveal that 
government intervention, especially at the local level, will facilitate an effective response to the 
disaster that negates the need for increased formal membership in civil society organizations. 
This would allow for individuals to feel more trusting of and closer to others via this effective 
response without requiring community members themselves to formally join organizations, 
resolving the contradiction noted above.  
  
METHODOLOGY 
 This section utilizes a case study approach to closely examine how one city’s response to 
a major hurricane played out. By using this approach, I can construct a narrative that will provide 
information that will confirm or disconfirm the potential explanations. In order to assess which, 
if any, of these possible explanations played out, I read local newspaper sources to understand 
what happened during and in the immediate aftermath of a major hurricane. 
I had to first determine which city and which storm to study. Since displacement as a 
result of a natural disaster is one major contributor to changes in social capital, as discussed in 
the literature review, I chose to focus on areas where there was displacement. To operationalize 
this, I used FEMA data on housing aid per capita as an approximate measure of how much 
damage was done to residents’ homes. This figure is the sum of the FEMA Individual Assistance 
and the Small Business Administration’s Disaster Home Loans divided by the population of the 
state. As the cost per capita increases, the more damage there was. As damage increases, the 
likelihood of displacement increases. I did this for every state affected by Hurricane Irene, 
Hurricane Sandy, and Hurricane Matthew in each respective year, as identified in the data 
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section. One limitation of this approach is that FEMA replaces what was damaged or lost in a 
storm, frequently resulting in wealthier areas receiving disproportionate aide due to having had 
more property value to lose in the first place (Howell & Elliott, 2019). A second limitation is that 
the housing aid data provided is an aggregate of all the disasters in the year the storm occurred 
for each state.  
 Based on that methodology, I identified Hoboken, NJ following Hurricane Sandy as the 
case study.  FEMA housing aid per capita was highest for NJ following Hurricane Sandy, at 
$119.96 per resident in 2012. In second place was NY in 2012, at $117.56 per resident in 
housing aid (Census Bureau, 2019a; FEMA, 2021). The damages that FEMA paid out in housing 
aid in NJ in 2012 included both Sandy and damage from a windstorm. In NY, FEMA only paid 
housing aid for the hurricane. Between NY and NJ, the most severely impacted areas ranged 
from the Jersey Shore to the New York City area, making up one large geographic region. Since 
New York City has an enormous population, it was difficult to narrow my scope effectively 
enough and still capture a whole community, leading me to settle on NJ even though some of its 
damage payments were for other events.  
After identifying key states which sustained significant housing damage, I used data on 
private property damage listed on the state’s webpage to determine the per capita cost to private 
property. This allowed me to identify which cities were affected particularly strongly by the 
hurricane. I placed several limitations on which types of cities I would study, restricting my 
search to areas with at least 50,000 residents but no more than 200,000. The purpose of this was 
to ensure there is a large enough population base for there to be independent, locality-focused 
groups and newspapers to allow me to focus on one city in particular, and also so that the city is 
not so large that it becomes difficult to effectively cover the whole community.  
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Within NJ, three of the cities that fit my population parameters that experienced the most 
per capita property damage include Brick, Elizabeth, and Hoboken, at $190.95, $376.17, and 
$1,999.80 in damage respectively (O’Dea, 2013). Based on this, Hoboken, NJ made the most 
sense as a case study.  
Having identified a city to use as a case study, I identified three newspaper sources that 
have online archives from the period immediately following the disaster in question. The sources 
that I chose had to be local in focus, and I gave preference to city-specific publications. While 
selecting a source, I took note of any bias of the publication. I did include publications with 
evident bias for the reason that they are still representative of how some people in the community 
view the events following the storms. I do not take what is reported in a biased publication as 
fact but instead as descriptors of a sub-population’s worldview, much in the way that a letter to 
the editor is not factual news reporting but remains informative about a person’s perspective.  
Due to the large volume of articles written, I chose to limit the timeframe to three months 
from the start of the storm in order to focus in closely on the events directly following the 
hurricane. By focusing on a narrower period of time, I can engage with events on a more detail-
specific level. Since I intend this case study to complement the large-scale view of the previous 
data section, I view the detail gained from examining a limited time frame as beneficial to 
rounding out this research.    
The three news sources selected for this case study are the following: The Hudson 
Reporter, Hoboken411, and NJ.com. The Hudson Reporter writes about the news events of 
Hoboken and the rest of Hudson County, with frequent online uploads throughout the week and 
weekly print publications. With its main office in Hoboken, in recent years it has expanded from 
primarily reporting on the city to the rest of the Hudson County as well. In addition to its news 
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reporting, it frequently publishes letters to the editor from local readers, frequently specifying the 
city where the writer resides.  
 Hoboken411 is a local Hoboken-specific online “alterative voice.” This publication 
exhibits strong right-wing bias and anti-science sentiments. Much of the news stories published 
on the site contain extensive editorializing, and for this reason little of the content of this source 
was used to assess events following the storm. Instead, it was used to examine conservative 
individuals’ viewpoints on and judgements of the community and government response.  
As an example of bias in Hoboken411, when reporting about a boat that was washed 
ashore during Sandy and then graffitied to read “Global warming is real,” the publication wrote 
of the anonymous individual responsible: “The person who wrote the original graffiti should 
have written ‘I believe what’s fed to me from the mainstream media, my idiot Facebook friends, 
and politicians…’” (Hoboken411, 2012c). When another anonymous person added to the graffiti 
so it then read “Global warming is real, and so is Santa Claus!” Hoboken411 wrote: “Bravo to 
whomever put the original idiot in their place” (Hoboken411, 2012c). As a result, I mainly used 
the opinion articles submitted by readers of the publication to provide insight into conservatives’ 
perspectives in the Democratic-run city. In select instances, I used stories with no apparent bias 
that publicized fundraising events in the community.  
 The last news source I used was NJ.com, an online publication hub of multiple New 
Jersey-based news publications, including The Jersey Journal, The Star-Ledger, NJ Advance 
Media for NJ.com, and select stories about New Jersey from national publications, such as the 
Associated Press. Both The Jersey Journal and The Star-Ledger are not published elsewhere 
online but are popular publications in the state as well as in Hoboken. I called and spoke to a 
librarian at the Hoboken Public Library who recommended both publications for this research. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DISASTERS                                                                                     61 
 
There are no opinion pieces or letters to the editor about Hurricane Sandy in Hoboken that were 
posted on the NJ.com site.  
After identifying the news sources to analyze, I read every article that mentioned the case 
study city and the hurricane in question from the storm’s date in late October 2012 to the end of 
January 2013, the third month after the storm. I used this to identify themes and patterns 
throughout the response to the hurricane. I used letters to the editor and opinion pieces to gauge 
how positively or negatively the residents of the city felt about various aspects of the response. 
The major actors that I looked for in the stories include the neighborhood groups, formal civil 
society groups, local government, the state government, and the federal government, which 




 Hoboken is a city just outside of New York City with a population of around 50,000 
people and occupies an area of about one square mile (City of Hoboken, 2010). The city has a 
higher median income than the US as a whole, at $105,710 annually in 2009 compared to 
$51,729 (City of Hoboken, 2010; Noss, 2010). It is somewhat whiter than average in the US, 
with 82% of its population being white compared to 76% in the rest of the country (City of 
Hoboken, 2010; Census Bureau, 2019b). The city has a more middle-aged population than the 
US’ overall demographics, with both children under 18 and adults over 65 underrepresented by 
around 10% each (City of Hoboken, 2010; Census Bureau, 2019b). Hoboken has a significantly 
higher proportion of renters than average, with 68% renting compared to 36% overall in the US 
(City of Hoboken, 2010; Census Bureau, 2019b).  
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 Given the known trends in social capital distribution in the US, the more homogenous 
racial composition and the elevated income level of the city make it probable that it has an 
elevated pre-existing level of social capital relative to other US cities (Zahnow et al., 2019; 
Wang & Ganapati, 2018). However, the higher proportion of renters and the narrowed age range 
in the city likely detract somewhat from that, being predictors of somewhat lower social capital 
levels on average (Zahnow et al., 2019; Wang & Ganapati, 2018). 
 Taking these demographics into account, Hoboken is not representative of the US’ 
population but appears to have a balance of positive and negative indicators of pre-existing social 
capital. Regardless of how representative or unrepresentative Hoboken is in terms of its 
demographic composition, this case study is not meant to make claims about other particular 
cases but only to evaluate if the potential explanations identified in the data section did in fact 
play out in a real case.  
 
COMMUNITY RESPONSE 
 Following Hurricane Sandy, there was a significant level of informal volunteerism and 
participation in mutual aid throughout the city. This was generally facilitated by the city 
government, who organized and recruited volunteers. It also was organized on a smaller scale by 
civic groups and businesses. Individuals themselves, particularly during and immediately after 
the hurricane, also spontaneously organized neighborhood aid. Residents remained engaged in 
recovery efforts for the whole three months following Sandy, participating in clean-up efforts, 
supplies distribution, and recovery fundraising.  
 This strong showing of community aid generated nearly uniformly positive attitudes 
towards the city and its residents, as voiced in opinion articles in local papers. There was almost 
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no mention of anti-social behavior by individuals, groups, or businesses. What was mentioned 
received minimal attention and was often overshadowed by praise of the community, even in the 
same article.  
 
Informal Support and Mutual Aid 
Informal support was provided by individuals, neighborhoods, non-profits, civic groups, 
and businesses, and it continued for several months after the hurricane. This support provided 
supplies, assistance in repairing damage, and fundraising for the community.  
One of the most notable occurrences immediately following Hurricane Sandy was the aid 
given between neighbors on an informal basis, which corresponds with my findings in the data 
section on self-help and mutual aid organizations. As many residents were left without power 
and ran low on food following the storm, there were numerous reports of neighbors offering their 
own food and electricity for others to use (Hack, 2012e). As nearly the whole city flooded and 
there were gas leaks and downed powerlines in the water, there were as many as 20,000 people 
trapped in their homes (Hudson Reporter, 2012e). Certain parts of Hoboken never lost power and 
offered free phone charging for anyone who came by; one family cooked eggs for anyone who 
was hungry (Hudson Reporter, 2012c; Hudson Reporter, 2012e). Some in areas that lost power 
but had their own generators also took part in sharing their electricity (Hudson Reporter, 
2012ae). The blocks in one area “were lined” with tables offering coffee, water, some food, and 
power strips (Hudson Reporter, 2012ae).  
Resident Phil Cohen lived in this area and participated in threading power cords for 
others to use alongside his neighbors (Hudson Reporter, 2012p). He attested that “someone even 
baked cookies” and another neighbor allowed others to watch the news on her TV (Hudson 
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Reporter, 2012p). Gary LaPelusa Sr. of the Gary LaPelusa Association hosted volunteer-
provided hot meals at St. Vincent’s basement during the storm (LaPelusa, 2012). Eleazar Reyes, 
a 17-year-old high school senior at Hoboken Charter School, described his family’s experience 
without power, heat, or working phones. “Family members couldn’t get in contact with you… 
we were running out of supplies,” he said (Hack, 2012e). He reported through this experience, he 
and his family got to know their neighbors better, and they themselves shared water with families 
that did not have any (Hack, 2012e). A resident named Chris wrote in to Hoboken411 to describe 
his experience of Sandy, saying when he left his apartment, he saw the tables set up in the area of 
11th & Bloomfield with charging stations and free food and beverages (Hoboken411, 2012a). He 
described the scene as “one big block party and I think it’s great how it symbolizes the feelings 
of community within Hoboken” (Hoboken411, 2012a). Chris noted some restaurants that 
provided free food to the community, such as Amanda’s Restaurant, and criticized Molfetta 
Pizzeria for raising prices during the storm (Hoboken411, 2012a).  
 The informal aid continued after the flooding receded, as many residents donated to local 
supply drives. The Hudson Reporter reported on Nov. 8 that “there are now suddenly hundreds 
of people who feel compelled to do something- anything- to help their fellow neighbors who lost 
nearly everything” (Hudson Reporter, 2012m). The volume of calls to the city hall asking how, 
where, and when to donate time or supplies was so large it overwhelmed the city hall staffers 
(Hudson Reporter, 2012m). Volunteers not only came from year-round residents but also from 
the local Stevens Institute of Technology in the city to help (Hudson Reporter, 2012m). 
Volunteers largely went door to door bringing supplies to those who needed them (Hack, 2012b). 
Much, but not all, of the aid and volunteering was coordinated by the local government, which 
will be discussed in more detail later.  
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 Residents also provided uncoordinated aide to local businesses and other groups. The 
Battaglia family, who owned a local store, wrote to the Hoboken Reported thanking “the 
amazing Hoboken community” after 50 friends, neighbors, and an “outpouring of help” came to 
assist them in repairing significant damage to their store (Battaglia et al., 2012). In a similar vein, 
the Hoboken Fire Department wrote a letter to the editor in the Hudson Reporter thanking and 
praising the community for the food that residents and businesses brought to them (Hoboken Fire 
Department, 2012). Additionally, the Hoboken Dual Language Charter School received loans of 
furniture, hours of volunteer cleaning, and donations of money and needed items following 
Sandy (Sargent, 2013). 
 Volunteering efforts persisted for several months after the storm. As many as 60 
volunteers came to the Thanksgiving Day meal for the elderly, homeless, disabled, and those 
without others to spend the day with that was hosted by David Brudnicki, senior pastor of the 
Urban Mission (Hudson Reporter, 2012v). Not all volunteers were from Hoboken, with some 
coming from all across NJ (Hudson Reporter, 2012v). Professional groups also took part in 
volunteering services, as a group of local counselors began offering free counseling at a local 
bookshop in January 2013 to those affected by the hurricane (Hoboken411, 2013).  
As a reflection of the activities just described, the Hudson Reporter called 2012 “the year 
of the volunteer” (Hudson Reporter, 2012ae). “The tragedies showed the creative ways in which 
people were willing to help- through grass-roots fundraising efforts, donating electricity to 
neighbors, and well-organized door-to-door volunteering” (Hudson Reporter, 2012ae). Hoboken 
Mayor Dawn Zimmer wrote in a letter to the editor in the Hudson Reporter of the general 
“outpouring of generosity that defined [the] response to Hurricane Sandy,” calling Hoboken a 
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“wonderful community” that was “persevering because of [its’] shared strength and resolve” 
(Zimmer, 2012).   
 Businesses in the area also provided aid during the storm, such as Kevin Murray, owner 
of Paddle Out Kayak Club, who donated boats to the EMS service, aiding them in rescuing 
residents experiencing medical emergencies who were stuck in their homes by the floodwaters 
(Wichert, 2012). Murray explained that he “wanted to do something to get into action” (Wichert, 
2012). Motorola donated generators for residents without power (Hack, 2012b). Local pizzeria 
Benny Tudino’s used a gas stove and generator to serve pizzas (Hack, 2012d). “I stayed here to 
serve my people,” owner Barry “Benny” Drishti said (Hack, 2012d). Other restaurants similarly 
provided free food through donations or by cooking for community members, such as Son 
Cubano, La Isla, Pilsner Haus, PintMeisters, and others (Hudson Reporter, 2012n; The Jersey 
Journal, 2012).  
Other businesses donated supplies to groups and individuals in need. The Hoboken 
Medical Center donated 10,000 water bottles for city residents distributed at the emergency 
operation center at Hoboken High School, while the Riverside Pediatric Group donated $20,000 
worth of formula, diapers, children’s clothing, and other essential supplies to the Boys and Girls 
Club of Hoboken (Hudson Reporter, 2012d; Hudson Reporter, 2012w). Other examples of 
businesses donating to the recovery effort include North Face and Barnes & Noble (Hudson 
Reporter, 2012x; Hudson Reporter, 2012ab). 
 Coordinated civil group aide came from the Mason Civic League and the American Red 
Cross, which worked with the local government and FEMA (Hack, 2012b). The Mason Civic 
League, founded by Hoboken councilwoman Beth Mason, created the Hudson County Recovers 
non-profit to collect donations of food and supplies for those affected by Hurricane Sandy (Hack, 
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2012b). Mason Civic League volunteers also worked with AmeriCare to provide medication to 
senior citizens and disabled residents (Hack, 2012b). This demonstrates a connection between 
civic groups as actors responding during the disaster and long-term coordination of aid.  
 Non-profits also contributed financial donations to aid low-income residents. Better 
Education Institute, the non-profit arm of Better Education for Kids, donated gift cards to the 
Hoboken Housing Authority for the agency to distribute, totaling $1.2 million in donations 
helping 12,0000 public housing residents (Hack, 2013b).  
 The most prominent fundraising effort was the Rebuild Hoboken Relief Fund. This fund 
was founded shortly after Hurricane Sandy, and it worked closely with and was advertised by 
Mayor Zimmer (Hudson Reporter, 2012i). Many local fundraisers put on by other groups 
donated their funds here (Hudson Reporter, 2012r; Hack, 2013a). Three months after the storm 
the fund had amassed more than $750,000, which it dispersed to qualified applicants in February 
2013 (Hudson Reporter, 2013b).  
Many fundraising events were also hosted by local businesses and groups to benefit 
recovery efforts. A “Miracle on River Street” holiday celebration was hosted on Dec. 7 with 
scheduled speakers and sales of a new postage stamp in “support of the revitalization of 
Hoboken…and to bolster community spirit” (Hudson Reporter, 2012y). Other fundraisings 
events included a holiday jewelry sale, fitness group discounts, arts events, comedy events, a 
make-a-thon, cut-a-thons, shopping crawls, and restaurant events (Kane, 2012; Ferrer, 2012; 
Hack, 2013a; Hudson Reporter, 2012r; Hudson Reporter, 2012t; Hudson Reporter, 2013d; 
Hudson Reporter, 2012z; Hoboken411, 2012b). NJ Tech Meet Up launched the Heal Hoboken 
Initiative and fundraised with community-themed merchandise, reading “Hoboken Strong” and 
“Heal Hoboken, No Storm Can Sink Us” (Kane, 2012.) This group aimed to raise $100,000 
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(Hudson Reporter, 2012t). Several community events were attended by celebrities (Hudson 
Reporter, 2013a; Hudson Reporter, 2013b; Kuperinsky, 2012). The proceeds from many of these 
events went to the Rebuild Hoboken Relief Fund or other local community groups (Hudson 
Reporter, 2013c). Other businesses offered discounts to those affected by the storm. Robert 
Bazouzi of Robert Bazouzi Salon offered a 50% discount to hurricane victims (Hudson Reporter, 
2012n). These events are representative of two functions of community fundraisers: generating 
money for recovery and boosting community spirit by theming the fundraisers around the city 
and its community. 
It is worth noting that Hoboken also received donations from around the country after 
receiving national attention for the damage sustained during Sandy. This led to a not 
insignificant influx of outside aid, such as the Train of Hope, sent from areas of Louisiana 
affected by Hurricane Katrina (Hudson Reporter, 2012ae). This does not reflect social capital 
within the community, but instead provides some context for its recovery, as the city was not 
required to fully support itself after the storm.  
 
Attitudes Toward the Community 
 Many residents noted strong feelings of pride, contentment, appreciation, and community 
towards other Hoboken residents following the hurricane. New Jersey Representative Rubin 
Ramos of Hoboken stated in a letter to the editor that the city always had a strong sense of 
community, but “still, nothing compares to the support [he has] seen between neighbors 
following the aftermath of Sandy. The commitment to volunteerism, pitching in, and watching 
out for your neighbor is why [he knows] the City of Hoboken will emerge stronger than before” 
(Ramos, 2012). He continued to say that “nothing can break this City’s spirit” (Ramos, 2012). 
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Hoboken resident Rose Orozco wrote to the Hudson Reporter: “The Community of Hoboken 
came alive, fed by the goodness, kindness, and generosity that was always there but 
unexpressed” (Orozco, 2012). Rev. Jody Lotito Levine described Sandy as taking down the 
“walls” between people, describing the “heart” shown by the community as “magical” (Levine, 
2013). Freeholder Bill O’Dea, a county-level official, said that “what [he] saw in the days after 
the storm gave [him] hope… people looked each other in the eyes, said ‘hello’ to each other” 
(Sullivan, 2012b). One anonymous writer wrote to Hoboken411: “I candidly admit that I have 
never been a witness to this magnitude of compassion and camaraderie…No power, no 
television, no computers nor cell phone service, yet crowds and gatherings of complete strangers 
talking, laughing, and exchanging stores” (“Sandy’s flowers,” 2012). 
 Also contributing to feelings of community cohesion were two community organized 
projects dedicated to remembering the experiences of Hoboken residents during the storm. The 
first is the Hoboken Historical Museum’s project to document the experiences of local residents 
of the hurricane, launched shortly after the storm (Hudson Reporter, 2012ac). It gathered audio 
recordings of community members describing their recollection of the storm and of the 
community (Hudson Reporter, 2012ac). The second was created by the local Hoboken Charter 
High School. The school created a ‘healing wall’ of 1,200 bricks of students’ stories, launched 
by Mira Septimus, art teacher and service-learning coordinator, to share students’ stories of the 
storm, and it encouraged other school to take part as well (Hack, 2012e). Septimus told The 
Jersey Journal that she wanted “to do something for the whole city… this project helps make the 
students realize how everyone of us was affected and helped them learn that through unity we all 
can learn how to heal” (Hack, 2012e).  
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 There was very little anti-social behavior during and after the storm, which indicates what 
anti-social behavior did occur had a limited effect on feelings of trust in the community or 
community cohesion. There was a small number of low-level crimes reported (Hudson Reporter, 
2012q). Hoboken411 alleged some theft of electricity during the storm, which was not reported 
elsewhere (Hoboken411, 2012a). Overall, “officials in several towns said all was quiet regarding 
crime, except for a few fights over gas” during the gas shortage (Hudson Reporter, 2012q). After 
these initial accounts, no real mention of crime during or directly after Hurricane Sandy was 
found in the local papers analyzed here. Additionally, there were few other negative accusations 
at people of groups. Some criticism was levied at PSE&G, the local power supplier, for 
inadequate preparation for the storm (Sullivan, 2012b).  
 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
 The government was involved in three ways during the response to and recovery from 
Hurricane Sandy. One was providing aid and rescue during the storm. This was provided by the 
local, state, and federal government. The second was organizing the community to facilitate 
volunteer and fundraising efforts both during and after the hurricane, which was primarily 
provided by the local government. And the third was providing financial resources to the 
community, which was primarily provided by the state and federal government.  
 
City Leadership, Community Volunteering, and Mutual Aid 
During the storm, the local government was involved with coordinating aid with the local 
community. Leading up to the storm, the city government had been recruiting volunteers, and it 
continued to coordinate and recruit them with an updated bulletin board in the town hall and 
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online postings throughout the storm (Hudson Reporter, 2012a; Hudson Reporter, 2012b; 
Hudson Reporter, 2012f). The volunteers primarily went around checking on the elderly, 
distributing medications, and operating supply distribution points for many days after the 
hurricane (Hudson Reporter, 2012f). The volunteers persisted through Nov. 5, over a week after 
the disaster, with 250 volunteers at the high school (Hudson Reporter, 2012h). Mayor Zimmer 
was also seen assisting volunteers, police officers, and members of the National Guard aiding 
stranded and distressed residents (Weichert & Star-Ledger, 2012).  
The city was also involved with providing information to the community throughout the 
storm. Zimmer appeared on TV asking for supplies to be sent to the city (Hudson Reporter, 
2012e). The city released maps of where to find supplies for residents to use, and a press release 
from the city implored residents to check on their neighbors (City of Hoboken, 2012a).  
 
Government Provision of Help 
During the hurricane, the local, state, and federal governments played roles in providing 
and financing aid and supplies. The city itself was also involved in distributing food to local 
shelters and individuals in need. The Hoboken Housing Authority received 2,500 meals from 
town officials, and a shelter on Bloomfield Street received 300 meals from town officials 
(Weichert & Star-Ledger). The state-level government activated the National Guard, who in 
addition to providing rescues of stranded residents also aided volunteer organizations to provide 
food at six points of distribution throughout the city during and immediately after the hurricane, 
distributing 25,000 meals and 10 tons of supplies for shelters (Hack, 2012a). The federal 
government’s response during the hurricane primarily consisted of declaring a state of 
emergency and activating FEMA aid (FEMA, 2012; Villanova, 2012).  
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 Directly following the storm, the local government remained heavily involved in the local 
community and its recovery efforts. The city also sent out a press release advertising the Rebuild 
Hoboken Relief Fund as the place to donate money to help the city recover (City of Hoboken, 
2012b). It also directed donations to the local high school to be distributed there by the ongoing 
volunteer efforts of the local residents (City of Hoboken, 2012b). The city remained active in 
organizing volunteer recovery events, including a city-wide clean up on Nov. 17, several weeks 
after the hurricane (Hudson Reporter, 2012s).  
 After the storm subsided, the local government began providing aid to residents to apply 
for federal loans, grants, and other disaster-related aid. There were two informational meetings 
for Hoboken residents to learn how to apply for federal aid hosted by the city (Hudson Reporter, 
2012o). Two local chambers of commerce held relief seminars for local businesses, attended by 
FEMA and other organizations (Hack, 2012c). Shortly after this, the city began meeting to draw 
up plans to be more prepared for the next hurricane (Hudson Reporter, 2012u). Later, Mayor 
Zimmer testified in front of the US Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, 
pushing for increased aid for “basement” apartments, who were unable to recoup insurance 
claims from their flood insurance due to loopholes in the plans (Hudson Reporter, 2012aa). She 
remained engaged in the progress of the recovery and continued to raise awareness of this 
loophole afterwards, saying the people of Hoboken were trapped in an “insurance gauntlet” 
(Hudson Reporter, 20121; Hudson Reporter, 2012ad).  
 Immediately following the storm, the state government took a more distant role in 
helping the community recovery, focusing on maintaining access to resources and voting in the 
upcoming presidential election. Due to the gas shortage, the state government ordered gas 
rationing, which precipitated some of the gas fights mentioned in the previous section (Hudson 
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Reporter, 2012j). The state government extended voting to accommodate the effects of the storm 
(Hudson Reporter, 2012k). In more direct interaction with the community, Gov. Chris Christie 
toured Hoboken (Hudson Reporter, 2012g).   
Following the hurricane, the federal government continued to play a role in opening 
funds for hurricane survivors but received both vocal criticism and praise from prominent state 
officials. Immediately following the hurricane, the federal government sent a team of FEMA and 
AmeriCorps personnel to Hoboken to enroll city residents in disaster aid programs (Villanova, 
2012). The EPA expedited fuel delivery to New Jersey to help resolve its fuel shortage resulting 
in gas rationing, drawing praise from US Senators Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) and Robert 
Menendez (D-NJ) (Hudson Reporter, 2012l). In Jan. 2013, Speaker John Boehner temporarily 
blocked a vote on Hurricane Sandy relief, drawing criticism from Gov. Christie, describing the 
Speaker as having played “our people…as a pawn” (DeChiaro, 2013). In more direct contact 
with the residents, then-Vice President Joe Biden visited the city shortly after the hurricane 
(Hack, 2012d). Altogether, the federal government played a relatively distant role vis a vis the 
community through its provision of aid and was vocally criticized by a key state-level politician.  
 
Reception of Government Aid by the Public 
The Mayor received praise and electoral rewards from the community following 
Hurricane Sandy, indicating approval of her job as Mayor, even as conservatives voiced their 
discontent with her actions in Hoboken411 (O’Brien, 2012; “Never forget”, 2012). Nonetheless, 
all of her backed proposals and candidates won in the 2012 election, demonstrating a resounding 
success for Zimmer and that those who disapproved of her and her policies were in the minority 
(Sullivan, 2012a). Resident Margaret O’Brien had approached Zimmer during the storm, 
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suggesting the medication delivery that Zimmer organized, and in a later letter to the editor, she 
thanked Zimmer and the community “who rose to the occasion… a simple thank you for my life 
doesn’t seem to be enough” (O’Brien, 2012). 
Some conservatives did argue that Zimmer was using Sandy for her own political profile, 
appearing too frequently on television, using her time out with first responders on rescue 
missions during the hurricane as a photo-op, and taking more credit than was her due for Rebuild 
Hoboken, among other criticisms (Hoboken411, 2012d; P., 2012; “Hoboken botches,” 2012). 
Nonetheless, she was regarded more widely as having consolidated her popularity thanks to her 
actions during and after the hurricane (Sullivan, 2012a).  
A few other officials received praise from the public in opinion pieces following the 
hurricane. Several other Hoboken elected officials received from praise, as well as Gov. Chris 
Christie (Wentworth, 2012). Councilman Tim Occhipinti received praise in an opinion article for 
his regular updates to his constituents throughout the hurricane (“Post Sandy,” 2012). No 
federal-level officials were praised publicly in these publications by Hoboken residents.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 Taken together, Hoboken’s experience of Hurricane Sandy appears to corroborate many 
of my findings from the data section. The results of the findings section demonstrate that both of 
my proposed explanations for the trends noted in the data section did play out in Hoboken, NJ 
following Hurricane Sandy. The community and government responses worked in tandem to 
facilitate volunteer-based distribution of aid and supplies during the storm as well as clean-up 
afterwards. Businesses and formal civic organizations also played a role in the provisioning of 
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aid during the storm. Afterwards, these groups primarily functioned as facilitators of fundraising 
efforts. 
In summation, it appears that Hoboken saw an outpouring of informal volunteerism that 
was directed in part by the government to promote an effective community response to the 
disaster without necessitating long-term formal institutional membership or participation. The 
focal point for organizing individual impulses to volunteer was the local government, as seen in 
Mayor Zimmer’s efforts to recruit volunteers prior to the storm as well as the centralized 
distribution of information through the city hall’s bulletin board. There is little reason to feel 
compelled to join long-term organizations when there was a successful volunteer-based 
community response, in part managed by the local government. Neither the community nor the 
local government are likely to disappear by the next disaster, presenting little incentive to 
become more involved in formal organizations as a member. This explanation differs somewhat 
from the ones that I proposed, as I did not anticipate the community and government working in 
such close tandem.  
The findings that communities feel more confident in their ability to respond to natural 
disasters after a significant disaster has been found elsewhere. Studies of collective efficacy in 
relation to social capital have found that activated social capital networks can result in increasing 
faith in community response after the disaster (Wickes et al., 2017; Benight, 2004). Successfully 
leveraging bonding, bridging, and linking social capital can raise collective efficacy and by 
extension faith in the community’s ability to respond to the next disaster. In light of this, it 
makes sense that a community might not feel a need to become formal members of organizations 
or might not maintain formal membership in organizations.  
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While the government played an important role in the response to Hurricane Sandy, there 
was significant activity outside of it. Informal volunteerism occurred outside of the context of 
government intervention, as seen in the pop-up neighborhood food and power distribution sites, 
which draws parallels between Hoboken’s experience and the findings on trust and mutual aid 
organizations in the data section. The bidirectional aid provided at these pop-up sites resembles 
the format of mutual aid groups. Compared to the findings on the measures of trust, the 
experiences of the residents of Hoboken also closely reflect the data section’s findings. Trust in 
others generally, trust in neighbors, and trust in strangers increased the most relative to 
unaffected regions, while trust in close contacts had less drastic findings. Considering this 
community aid occurred primarily between strangers and neighbors while family members 
remained unreachable due to the power outages and flooding in the city, this closely resembles 
the positive experience reported by many in Hoboken.  
The findings on sense of community align somewhat less between the WVS data and the 
experience of residents of Hoboken. In the city, there was repeated, strong praise of the 
community voiced in local papers. Additionally, there were multiple events meant to 
commemorate the community’s experiences, and many of the fundraisers put on by local 
businesses were framed around the community specifically. This appears to indicate a higher 
level of a sense of community compared to before the storm. In contrast, the WVS data revealed 
generally decreasing senses of community, with a key caveat being that the areas affected by 
hurricanes felt considerably more connected than the unaffected regions. It seems possible given 
the long time span that Hoboken is not actually an exception, but instead it received only a 
temporary bump in community cohesion as a result of the storm, and in the long run it more 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DISASTERS                                                                                     77 
 
closely resembles the findings of other affected areas. It may be this possible temporary bump 
that resulted in the higher feelings of connection in the 2017 survey than in the unaffected areas.  
These findings on the role of the government somewhat corroborate the findings of 
Wickes et al. (2015) and Melo Zurita et al. (2018) but contrasts with the relationship found 
between social capital and governments in the research of Rahill et al. (2014). Wickes et al. 
(2015) found that strong government intervention mitigated the predictive effect for social 
capital on disaster response and recovery. Similarly, following Hurricane Sandy, Hoboken’s city 
government acted as an equalizer of social capital, connecting with those cut off from 
community resources. This disrupts a direct predictive relationship between pre-existing social 
capital and outcomes following the hurricane. However, this was in part facilitated by the 
government proactively cultivating linking social capital between itself and residents, which was 
not part of the findings of Wickes et al. (2015) but was emphasized by Melo Zurita et al. (2018). 
Rahill et al. (2014) found that the patrimonial functioning of Haiti’s government following the 
2010 earthquake exacerbated inequalities in social capital, providing better benefits to those with 
more connections. By not being patrimonial but instead actively reach out to under-connected 
residents, Hoboken’s response exhibited the opposite tendency as the one documented there. 
The local government’s actions and direct communication and coordination with 
residents represents a strong usage of linking social capital, reducing the need for bonding or 
bridging capital to respond to the disaster. Through its organizing actions, the local government 
served as an equalizer of unequal social capital access. It provided wide-ranging, easily 
accessible information on aid and volunteer opportunities, allowing anyone regardless of prior 
connections to become involved and receive aid. Additionally, it targeted volunteer services 
towards aiding those stranded at home, particularly the elderly, providing them with medications 
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they otherwise would have been unlikely to have received. This particular facet of the response 
to the storm was spurred by the suggestion of an individual resident. The well-coordinated 
response facilitated by the local government allowed this idea to be implemented successfully, 
amplifying the reach of one individual’s ideas by extending linking social capital to connect 
residents directly to the centralized power of the local government.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 The findings of the case study demonstrate that the two explanations I identified in the 
data section did play a role in the response to and recovery from Hurricane Sandy in Hoboken. It 
demonstrates that effective government response and community volunteerism can work in 
tandem to promote a strong sense of community and trust in others. This supports my findings 
that organizational membership generally did not increase in the data section, except for mutual 
aid organizations, who most resemble the informal networks of aid observed in Hoboken. The 
implications of this in terms of social capital more broadly is not only that informal volunteerism 
can serve as a form of behavioral social capital to complement attitudinal social capital but also 
that government intervention can play a role in facilitating this phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
The findings of this research indicate that social capital generally increased following the 
hurricanes studied here, facilitated by government intervention and informal group coordination. 
These findings affirm Putnam’s (1993) tenant that social capital works in virtuous or vicious 
cycles, however it also highlights that not all types of social capital are affected equally or in the 
same way. For example, formal membership did not generally increase in the areas studied, but 
as found in the case study of Hoboken, there was significant informal group behavior. Changes 
in social capital can also be mediated by outside factors, such as government intervention. The 
close relationship between government intervention and community-generated informal 
volunteerism also stands out, highlighting the intertwining relationship between social capital 
and its sociopolitical context.  
These findings are important especially in light of the general ambiguity in the literature 
on social capital and disasters. In the context of increasing intensity of hurricanes, there is a 
pathway towards increasing social capital should individual and governmental aid successfully 
intervene post-disaster. However, there is no assurance that this will happen after every disaster, 
highlighting the importance of keeping social capital in mind while planning for and rebuilding 
from disasters.  
What remains less clear if to what extent these trends would hold true in other contexts. 
More research is needed to flesh out the role of government after a disaster in relation to social 
capital. For example, patrimonial governments or highly isolated communities might not exhibit 
the same use of linking and bridging social capital that was observed in Hoboken. In a different 
scenario, a highly criticized government response, such as the one after Hurricane Katrina in the 
US, might yield different results as well.  
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DISASTERS                                                                                     80 
 
It should be noted that there are several limitations on the applicability of this research. 
The data section divides states based on gubernatorial and presidential disaster declarations, and 
as a result it generalized the experiences of states. One advantage of this is that it includes 
residents who may have been displaced as a result post-disaster rent gaps, but nonetheless is a 
key point to note when interpreting this data. A second limitation is that this research does not 
draw conclusions about sub-population groups’ levels of social capital and community 
involvement. A third limitation is that as social capital is path dependent, the trends noted here 
may not be applicable in places with different pre-existing levels of social capital. What can be 
concluded is that areas with effective non-patrimonial governments and moderate pre-existing 
levels of social capital, such as in Hoboken, are likely to see increases in social capital following 
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Appendix A 
Bounds of the Central Limit Theorem for the WVS Data 
 
Table A 
  2011 2017 
Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Hit At Least Once 1.17% 98.83% 1.02% 98.98% 
Hit Twice or More 1.75% 98.25% 1.44% 98.56% 
Unaffected 0.73% 99.27% 0.67% 99.38% 
 
Note. These are the bounds identified by the central limit theorem for the percentages able to be tested in a 




























Association Between Unaffected Gulf States and Community Closeness 
 
This graph represents the same data as Fig. 4 with the addition of the results for the 
unaffected gulf states, which are comprised of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. This 
is one of only two measures where the unaffected gulf states’ results are notably distinct from the 
rest of the unaffected states. As mentioned in the findings section of the third chapter, this is 
indicative of a general protection against decreasing closeness in the unaffected gulf states, 
which are frequently affected by hurricanes. It is important to note that this effect is weaker than 
the one found for the states affected by Hurricane Irene, Hurricane Sandy, and Hurricane 
Matthew. 
 
  Figure B1. 
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Appendix C 
Association Between Unaffected Gulf States and Self-Help/Mutual Aid 
 
This graph represents the same data as Fig. 7 with the addition of the results or the 
unaffected gulf states, which are comprised of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. This 
is the second of the two measures where the unaffected gulf states’ results are notably distinct 
from the rest of the unaffected states. As seen in the figure below, the unaffected gulf states do 
not follow the patterns seen in the other unaffected states or in the affected states. This may be 
driven by factors not studied here but might also speak to an association between membership in 
this type of organization and living in an area generally affected by hurricanes. Both potential 
explanations cannot be proven or disproven here and will require further research.  
 
  Figure C1. 
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Appendix D 
No Association Between Unaffected Gulf States and Other Social Capital Measures 
 
Appendix D contains all of the graphs not already shown in a previous appendix that 
contain the results for the affected areas affected by one or more hurricanes as well as two or 
more hurricanes and both the general unaffected area and the unaffected gulf states. This section 
includes every question analyzed in the data section except for the results for mutual aid/self-
help organizations and the results for closeness to the local community.  
These figures demonstrate that the unaffected gulf states most resemble the general 
unaffected area, and the only two measures where this does not hold true are showcased above 
and discussed in the findings section of the third chapter. Overall, this affirms that the 
connections found between experiencing one or more hurricanes and social capital are likely 
related to experiencing the specific hurricanes in question rather than the result of being located 
in an area typically affected by hurricanes. This is demonstrated by the gulf states, which are 
often affected by hurricanes along with much of the East Coast but was not affected by the 
specific hurricanes analyzed here. These results help to round out the generalizations made by 
sorting all states into the affected and unaffected group and further provide support for the 
findings of this research.  
  














   



























  Figure D4. 
 
 


















  Figure D6. 
 
 

















  Figure D8. 
 
 


















  Figure D10. 
 
 
 
  
 
